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Abstract
Ontology Learning (OL) is the computational task of generating a knowledge base in the form of an ontology
given an unstructured corpus whose content is in natural language (NL). Several works can be found in this area
most of which are limited to statistical and lexico-syntactic pattern matching based techniques (Light-Weight OL).
These techniques do not lead to very accurate learning mostly because of several linguistic nuances in NL. Formal
OL is an alternative (less explored) methodology were deep linguistics analysis is made using theory and tools found
in computational linguistics to generate formal axioms and definitions instead simply inducing a taxonomy. In this
paper we propose “Description Logic (DL)” based formal OL framework for learning factual IS-A type sentences
in English. We claim that semantic construction of IS-A sentences is non trivial. Hence, we also claim that such
sentences requires special studies in the context of OL before any truly formal OL can be proposed. We introduce a
learner tool, called DLOLIS−A , that generated such ontologies in the owl format. We have adopted “Gold Standard”
based OL evaluation on IS-A rich WCL v.1.1 dataset and our own Community representative IS-A dataset. We
observed significant improvement of DLOLIS−A when compared to the light-weight OL tool Text2Onto and formal
OL tool FRED.
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1. Introduction
ONTOLOGY LEARNING (OL) is the process of automated generation of ontologies from documents that are
primarily textual (i.e. Natural Language (NL) content). The core objective of OL is to automatically build a knowl-
edge base that formally represents both assertive facts as well as general truth statements expressed in some NL in
these textual documents. A formal knowledge base allows logical reasoning supported Semantic Information Re-
trieval (SIR) [1], Question-Answering (QA) [2], Machine Translation (MT) [3], etc. However, OL is a challenging
task since formal ontology generation is hard as it involves accurate NL understanding and thereby translation of NL
textual content into an equivalent formal representation. Depending upon the degree of formalization (i.e. degree of
approximation of semantic equivalence in formal translation) OL can be classified into two broad families: (i) Light-
weight OL and (ii) Formal OL [4]. Since NL understanding is intrinsically difficult due to natural semantic nuances
in natural language text, most approaches in the area of OL has been statistical in nature (i.e. light-weight). The
principal assumption in light-weight OL is distributional hypothesis that states that two concepts (i.e. lexical entities)
having similar meaning have similar distribution (or context) in a given corpus [5]. This assumption lead to research
works proposing semantic similarity computation of pair of concepts using techniques such as co-occurrence analysis
and LSA [6]. Based on such similarity measures concepts are then clustered into a hypernymy hierarchy (i.e. IS-A
hierarchy) using ML techniques such as clustering, probabilistic term subsumption, association rule mining, etc [4].
However, distributional hypothesis can be contested to be rather weak for several reasons: (i) concepts that are syn-
onymous might not occur together in the same contextual window (paragraph, page, document) thereby making the
co-occurrence of two concepts very low or even zero since the usage of one concept might restrict the usage of other
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synonymous/hyponymous/hypernymous concepts in a given context, (ii) even with LSA based approaches where the
previous problem can be overcomed to a certain extent, it may be so that high co-occurrence may mean semantic
relatedness in contrast to semantic similarity (e.g. high co-occurrence of the concepts man and home in a given text
corpus), and (iii) there are synonymous concepts for a given concept that are relatively less used linguistically primar-
ily because of low readability thereby generating a very different distribution than the given concept.To eliminate this
shortcoming several hybrid approaches have been proposed where surface level linguistic analysis is done to generate
hypernym hierarchy [7–19]. Although these techniques help to generate richer and more accurate ontologies yet due
to lack of principled deep linguistic analysis they fail to capture the complete semantics of textual content. This leads
to poor recall in most cases.
Formal OL attempts to resolve the low recall problem by focusing more on deep linguistic analysis (i.e. NL
understanding) of textual content. NL understanding involves developing systematic and formal linguistic methods
of building a sound interface between syntax (i.e. grammar) and semantics (i.e. meaning) of NL sentences. It has to
be understood that the connotation of the term “learning” for formal OL may not always correspond to the general
notion of statistical machine learning and can be equivalently interpreted as ontology extraction/induction. In this
paper we follow the popular Davidsonian truth-conditional notion [20]1 as well as the Chomskyian internalist notion
[21] since such an approach renders itself to be neatly integrated with a model theoretic formal semantic notion
prevalent in mathematical logic. Our fundamental hypothesis is that all factual sentences in English can be translated
into corresponding Description Logics (DL) [22] expressions without loss of semantics.
The particular problem addressed in this paper is formal OL on factual IS-A type documents in English. For
an example, a sentence such as: “Human is a clever animal” is considered as an IS-A sentence. We particularly
emphasize that to develop a sound theoretical foundation of formal OL in general we first need to have a thorough
review of linguistic analysis of IS-A sentences [23, 24]. It can be observed that the core grammatical structure of
an IS-A sentence is of the form: [S ub ject(S )][IS − A][Ob ject(O)]. IS-A sentences are naturally axiomatic in nature
from an ontological standpoint. In the above example we can derive the axioms: Human sub class of Clever Animal;
Clever Animal sub class of Animal. However, our primary argument in this paper is that IS-A sentences do not always
render their axiomatic characterization as easily as it might apparently seem to be. We hereby distinguish two different
types of IS-A sentences: (i) non-trivial IS-A sentences (which we address specifically) and (ii) trivial IS-A sentences
(which we address in general). Non-trivial IS-A sentences are special cases where a general semantic interpretation
procedure during OL over a given grammatical structure (say a parse tree) will fail and lead to semantically invalid or
incomplete axioms. A learned axiom is semantically invalid if the semantics of the corresponding IS-A sentence is
not preserved after the formal translation procedure while it is incomplete if the semantics is partially preserved. We
argue that non-trivial IS-A sentences can constitute a major portion of factual corpus on which an OL task is to be
carried out. This means that lack of proper linguistic and formal analysis of non-trivial IS-A sentences can result in
poorly learned ontologies.
We propose a DL based OL framework and the corresponding tool called DLOLIS−A. DLOLIS−A is able to lin-
guistically characterize most IS-A sentences in English (both trivial and non-trivial) in the simple, complex, and
compound forms. DLOLIS−A then automatically generates an axiomatic ontology by converting the IS-A sentences
into semantically equivalent corresponding DL definitions and assertions. Such conversion is based on the principle
of non-monotonic reasoning and hence, knowledge revision is carried out as new definitions and assertions are intro-
duced. In this paper we leave out the details of non-monotonic reasoning and keep it for future work. We understand
that a complete OL tool should also be able to cover non-ISA sentences and the extended version of DLOLIS−A,
DLOLFULL , is a work-in-progress. We observed that DLOLIS−A significantly outperforms current benchmark statis-
tical OL tool Text2Onto [14] and formal OL tool FRED [25] when tested on a community representative trivial and
non-trivial IS-A dataset (Table A.1 and Table A.2). We observed similar overall accuracy of DLOLIS−A on WCL
v. 1.1 dataset [26] .
Our contribution in this paper can be summarized as follows:
1. A novel subject-object dependency analysis theory termed characterization for simple, complex, and compound
factual IS-A sentences in English is proposed. It is to be noted that characterization is not yet another grammar
theory (as discussed in section 4.1)
1It should be noted that there are counter-arguments against the Davidsonian view that ignores sentential intension or Fregean senses.
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2. Proposing DL as the most suitable candidate semantic theory for formal OL on factual sentences.
3. DL interpretations for trivial and non-trivial factual IS-A sentences.
4. As a by product of contribution (3), a generic and domain independent formal OL tool called DLOLIS−A has
been proposed.
5. A community representative dataset on trivial and non-trivial IS-A sentences has been prepared and released.
The paper is organized into the following sections: (i) related work outlining some of the major contributions in
light-weight and formal OL, (ii) problem statement defining formal OL, (iii) approach in which IS-A sentences are
formally characterized, and T-Box/A-Box rules proposed, and (iv) comparative evaluation in terms of accuracy on
WCL dataset and our own representative datasets.
2. RELATED WORK
There has been significant literature over the last decade on the problem of Ontology Learning (OL). Most of
these works can be categorized into two approaches as discussed earlier: (i) Light-weight Ontology Learning, and
(ii) Formal Ontology Learning. Light-weight ontology learning from text documents is arguably the most widely
used approach in the field of OL [4]. It can be further divided into two general approaches: (i) distributional and (ii)
lexico-syntactic pattern based.
2.1. Light-weight OL: Distributional Semantics
A large portion of research on light-weight OL heavily draws models and methodologies primarily from the area
of statistical learning with the assumption of paradigmatic distributional hypothesis (as discussed in the introduction
section). The central objective is to model a concept similarity measure thereby creating semantic spaces derived
from two alternative models: (i) spatial models, and (ii) probabilistic models. In spatial models concept similarity
is computed using distance (or similarity) measures in high-dimensional vector space. Vector-space based similarity
model computation can be: (i) angular (such as cosine similarity [27], Jaccard similarity [28]), (ii) matrix operation
based (such as term-document based matrix models like LSA [29] or term-context terms based matrix models like
HAL [30]). While many of these approaches neglect the word order in the assumed context for generating the semantic
space some advanced works incorporate the order in their measure [31]. Semantic spaces that are created in these ways
are mostly language independent and do not take into account the syntactic structure within and across sentences.
This leads to poor semantic similarity computation [32]. Other advanced techniques extend vector-space models with
morpho-syntactic information such as POS tagging as in [33], shallow syntactic analysis as in [34], and complete
linguistic parsing as in [35]. The key idea is to select context words that have meaningful syntactic relationship
with the target words (i.e. concepts whose similarity has to be computed). A general algorithmic framework for
computing such extended semantic space is proposed in [6]. Later stage researches extended the spatial model based
paradigmatic distributional hypothesis to ideas borrowed from distributional language modeling. One key research
direction is pLSA [36] where the basic assumption is that latent variables in statistical models correspond to semantic
topics. The core idea is to compute similarity between concepts in terms of their degree to which they share the same
topic distribution. More advanced techniques include Latent Dirichlet Model [37], and Probabilistic Topic Models
[38] which extend the probabilistic idea by adding prior distributions to term-topic and/or topic-document distributions
for tighter density estimation of term-document distribution. However, it has been observed in [39] that both these
approaches are not computationally scalable as compared to pLSA.
Several approaches have been proposed to solve NLP tasks such as: (i) relation extraction [40–44], (ii) named
entity recognition [45], and (iii) term extraction [46]. All such tasks are essentially sub-tasks of the OL pipeline.
An early work on OL as an end-to-end application was proposed in [47, 48] where noun terms were organized into
hypernymic trees using bottom-up hierarchical clustering algorithm. In [49] a clustering based algorithm called CBC
was proposed for generating concept lists of similar instances with sense discrimination. However, such lists were
unlabeled and hence, not useful in applications such as question-answering as observed in [50]. In this work a
top-down clustering based approach was proposed where semantic classes (generated using the CBC algorithm) are
automatically labeled using syntactic pattern based class signatures. An ant-based clustering approach can be found
in [51] where concepts are identified as part of OL using Normalized Google Distance (NGD) [52] and a new n◦ of
Wikipedia similarity measures. However, this work cannot be categorized as text corpus based OL but rather concept
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hierarchy induction on collection of terms. Alternative non-clustering based techniques have been proposed that fall
under the general category of distributional semantics based OL. One work has used Formal Concept Analysis (FCA)
for concept identification and hierarchical concept group formation [53]. Another more recent interesting approach
can be found in [54] where Hierarchical Random Graph (HRG) based lexical taxonomy learning has been proposed.
In this work the input is a text corpus and a set of given terms over which a semantic network is generated using
distributional semantic similarity measure. An HRG is then fit over the generated semantic network using MLE and
Monte Carlo Sampling. The claim is that the technique outperforms popular flat and hierarchical clustering algorithms.
Other probabilistic and information theoretic models have also been proposed as in [55] where OL is done on top of
folksonomies as input.
2.2. Light-weight OL: Lexico-Syntactic Pattern
An alternative approach for light-weight OL that has been extensively explored in the research community is
heavily based on lexico-syntactic patterns. This particular research direction can be sub-classified into six broad
categories: (i) supervised learning based, (ii) unsupervised learning based, (iii) semi-supervised learning based, (iv)
graph based, (v) probabilistic linguistic structure instantiation based, and (vi) rule based. An important work in
supervised learning based OL is found in [56] where supervised classifiers were trained on hyponymy and cousin
relation rich dataset and then tested on unknown sentences that had to be classified into a particular relation type
and fit onto the WordNet semantic network. Another supervised learning based ontology learner, called JAGUAR, is
proposed in [7] where 6 primary syntactic patterns where identified together with 5 verb patterns. Classifiers were
then trained on text containing such patterns so as to classify sentences into one of the 26 semantic relations discussed
in [40]. A lexico-syntactic based unsupervised ontology learner has been described in [45]. This learner is basically
the sub-class extractor component of the KnowItAll system [8]. This sub-class extractor uses the 8 IS-A Hearst pattern
rules described in [9] together with web-search match results of linguistic patterns to generate new candidate terms
for sub-class identification. A semi-supervised taxonomic induction framework is proposed in [10]. In this work an
ontology metric has been formulated that includes term context, co-occurrence, and lexico-syntactic patterns. This
metric is then used to induce a lexicalized taxonomy given a set of concepts. A graph based approach can be found in
[11]. This work assumes that a set of root primitive concepts will be given to the system as input. It then extracts new
term pairs having the root terms as one of the pair element from the Web such that the sentences extracted contain
Hearst patterns. This set of term pairs is then searched on the Web again to get all triples containing the pairs. The
hyponymy graph is then generated by selecting terms that have a minimum IS-A out-degree with respect to a root term.
Another very recent graph based ontology learner, called OntoLearn Reloaded, has been proposed in [12]. OntoLearn
works in five steps. First it extracts terms from a document corpus using TermExtractor tool [46] after which a set
of definitional sentences containing the extracted terms is selected using the WCL classifier [13]. These definitional
sentences are then filtered according to domain resulting in a noisy hypernymic graph. A pruning procedure is carried
on the noisy graph to generate a tree-like taxonomy. As a final step a DAG based taxonomy is formed by reviving
incorrectly deleted edges during the pruning process. A work of significant research interest and perhaps one of the
most popular benchmark OL tool is Text2Onto [14]. Text2Onto is based on instantiation of probabilistic linguistic
structures called POM (Probabilistic Ontology Model). POM structures are language independent and can be easily
transported to RDFS/OWL/F-Logic by ontology engineers. POMs are essentially 7 types of linguistic frames (or
patterns) as defined in Gruber’s frame ontology [15]. They are probabilistic in the sense that an instance membership
in a particular POM is associated with a degree of belief based on evidences in the corpus. Linguistic analysis of text
corpus is based on the JAPE transducer [16] for matching Hearst patterns and POM patterns in order to instantiate the
POM patterns. A very distinguishing feature of Text2Onto is semi-automatic revisioning of ontology as the ontology
evolves learning new instances. Finally a several of OL techniques have been proposed that it purely rule based with
application of linguistic heuristic and supporting knowledge sources such as Wikipedia [17–19].
2.3. Formal OL
There is a considerable shortage of literature that can be truly classified as formal OL (as has been observed in [4]).
Perhaps a major reason is that formal OL is primarily dependent on deep NL understanding which involves rigorous
application of theory of computational semantics. Early works related to formal OL primarily focus on inducing
disjoint axioms in a given ontology (learned or manual) so as to debug modeling errors. A heuristic approach (called
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semantic clarification) based on the assumption of strong disjointness [57] has been proposed in [58]. There has also
been several machine learning (ML) based approaches to disjoint axiom induction. One supervised learning based
framework called LEDA was proposed in [59, 60] where manually created disjoint axioms were used as the training
dataset. Another ML based approach can be found in [61] where unsupervised mining of disjoint axioms from text
corpus was proposed. Other alternative techniques for disjoint axiom induction include one work based on FCA
[62] and another, called DL-Learner, based on inductive logic programming [63]. There has been a recent work on
association mining based disjoint axiom induction [64]. This work was further extended in [65] where three alternative
approaches have been proposed - two based on negative association mining (i.e. confidence measure of whether
membership in one class implies non-membership in another class) and one based on statistical correlation analysis
(using φ-coefficient to measure strength of disjointness between two concepts where complete disjointness has a φ
value of -1.0). Apart from disjoint axiom induction there has been one work that focused on negation axiom induction
[66] where an ontology repairing tool called ORE was proposed. However, none of the works described so far can be
called end-to-end formal OL on text corpus but all are, rather, semi-formal ontology enrichment methodologies.
Perhaps one of the first approaches towards formal OL can be found in [67]. In this work a very novel approach
for probabilistically inducing formal structures (First Order Predicate Logic (FOL) derivative) from text has been
outlined. The technique is based on the principle of deep transfer learning which postulates that a model can gener-
alize structures from one domain (called source) and be plugged into another model in a completely different domain
(called target) to increase both the efficiency and accuracy of target model. For deep transfer Markov Logic Network
induction was used where FOL formulae are represented as graph structures and clique structures within the graph
representing the set of such FOL formulae are modeled as Markov network. This work was extended further in [68].
Another similar work can be found in [69]. Here a tool called OntoUSP was proposed where the input to the system
was a dependency-parsed text and the output is a probabilistic auto-learned ontology with IS-A and part-of relations.
The semantic parsing required for inducing high order Markov formulae [70] is unsupervised. However, all such tech-
niques do not use significant research outcomes that have been reported in theoretical and computational semantics
within the linguistic community and also in NL understanding based question-answering that are closely related to
the problem of OL.
Computational semantics largely involves the algorithmic feasibility and mechanism for translating NL sentences
into semantically equivalent formal language expressions so as to represent its meaning. Several formal semantic the-
ories, primarily adapting the Davidsonian notion [20] and Chomskyan notion [21] of meaning together wiht Fregean
principle of compositional semantics, have been proposed in this direction. Perhaps the most influential pioneering
theory is what is known as Montague Grammar [71]. Montague Grammar is a model theoretic representation of
natural language and its computational feasibility is proven by the applicability of λ-calculus [72] to construct the
semantics over a parse tree generated by a particular grammar. Another alternative computational technique for se-
mantic construction is feature structures [73]. More recent semantic theories, mostly proposed to deal with semantic
interpretation across sentence boundaries, include Discourse Representation Theory [74] and File Change Semantics
[75]. A computational tool for DRT based semantic representation, called BOXER, has been proposed in [76]. This
tool generates semantic representations in DRS form (Discourse Representation Structure) after syntactically pars-
ing sentences using CCG (Combinatory Categorial Grammar). However, the first and perhaps the only OL tool to
incorporate BOXER, and for that matter any true linguistic component, for formal OL was FRED [25]. FRED also
incorporates linguistic frames and ontology design patterns with Wikipedia as an external supporting source.
3. PROBLEM STATEMENT
3.1. Formal Ontology Learning Tasks
Formal OL can involve five core tasks:
Task 1: To choose a formal grammar G that has: (i) maximum generative capacity of the underlying natural
languageLNL (English in our case) and (ii) semantic saturation (in the Fregean sense). Maximum generative capacity
implies the extent of G to generate (i.e. produce) all possible grammatically correct English sentences. Semantic
saturation implies that any sentence that can be generated using G should have a complete meaning linguistically. It
is to be noted that the formal grammar G is associated with a formal semantics GJ .
Task 2: To select a formal language F that has an interpretation FI such that there exists a one to one correspon-
dence with the semantic interpretation GJ of the formal grammar G. In other words, if S is a meaningful sentence
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generated by G then there exists a unique expression E in F that is satisfiable in FI and also has a representational
equivalence with S (in the model-theoretic sense).
Task 3: To model a representational equivalence function τLNL that takes, as an input, a sentence S in LNL and
maps it to an expression E in F such that maximum semantic preservation is achieved. Such semantic preservation
can be achieved through model-theoretic semantic construction. Ideally complete semantic preservation is the holy
grail of mathematical linguistics. However, the “natural semantic nuances” in sentences are too subtle to be captured
in a generative way by a well formed formal semantic theory. There are certain English sentences that are inherently
ambiguous within the context window of the sentences. An example can be the following two sentences: “A boy is
clever.” vs. “A planet is round”. The grammatical structure as well as the Part-Of-Speech (POS) tags of the tokens
in both the sentences are same. Yet the linguistic reading of the first sentence holds true for a specific boy while it
holds true for the entire planet class in the second sentence. Hence, sentences having same grammatical structure may
not have the same interpretation rule. τLNL should be able to tackle sentences with multiple interpretations as far as
possible. Moreover, τLNL should be consistent and should not generate expressions that are mutually inconsistent.
Task 4: To build a formal consistent ontologyO from the set of formal expressions E in F that is generated as an
output of task 3.
Definition 1 (Formal Ontology): A formal ontology (denoted O) is a 5-tuple structure: 〈 C,R,I,C,R 〉
where :
• C: Set of concepts that formally represents entity class.
• R: Set of roles that formally represents relations between entity classes.
• I: Set of instances that formally represent individuals belonging to the entity classes.
• C: Partial order over the set of concepts C where the order relation formally represents an IS-A relation
between any two ordered entity classes.
• R: Partial order over the set of roles R where the order relation formally represents an IS-A relation between
any two ordered entity class relations.
It is to be noted that concepts have correspondence with the 1-place predicate clauses in a formal logic based F
while roles have correspondence with 2-place predicate clauses. Concepts are related to other concepts through roles
according to the basic triplet structure : 〈Subject,Predicate,Object〉. Such a triplet can also be seen as definition of the
subject.
Task 5: To check the consistency of the ontology O using a satisfiability checker, like reasoner, applicable to the
chosen formal language F . An additional job of the reasoner is to transform the formal definitional ontology O into
an axiomatic (also called generalized) ontology having a taxonomic IS-A structure.
3.2. Problem Scope & Motivation
The current scope of the paper is limited to formal OL of IS-A type factual document content in English. IS-A type
sentences consists the core syntactic structure: [S ub ject][IS A][Ob ject]. An example would be: “John is a golfer.”
An IS-A corpus can include all variations of IS-A sentences in simple, complex, and compound forms.
We argue that IS-A sentence syntactic characterization (i.e. identification of the category of IS-A sentence and
the subject-object dependency) and subsequent semantic formalization is non-trivial. A sentence is trivial if the
semantics can be directly generated from the underlying grammatical structures using conventional Montagovian
intensional theories of semantics (such as Discourse Representation Theory - DRT [74], etc). On the other hand a
sentence is non-trivial if, as opposed to trivial IS-A sentences, sentence interpretation cannot be directly generated
as such. This is mainly because the semantics of the latter category largely depends on: (i) subject-object part-of-
speech (POS) dependency (such as NNP IS-A JJ does not have same semantic interpretation as NNP IS-A NN while
several other combinations are semantically invalid), (ii) semantic variations of IS-A (such as is like, includes, etc that
are not exactly same as IS-A) (iii) pragmatic usage of certain phrasal structures (for an example, the way modifiers
specializes a subject/object can be very contextual and may not follow a strict pattern), (iv) tense ambiguity arising
due to temporal nuances, and (v) epistemic ambiguity (i.e. the truth of a concept definition). Each of these five
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cases are expounded in this paper along with their semantic representational issues. We claim that majority of factual
non-trivial IS-A sentence semantics can be captured using special translation rules by Description Logics (DL) as an
alternative model-theoretic approach for semantics. We also claim that such non-trivial IS-A sentence can constitute a
large portion of many factual corpus (as will be supported with our own custom-made non-trivial IS-A sentence corpus
that is completely factual in nature) making our case that OL on non-trivial IS-A sentences needs special study.
3.3. Problem Formulation
Given a dynamic set of English IS-A sentences SIS−A model a transformation function τIS−A such that:
• τIS−A : SIS−A 7→ FIS−A
• ∀s ∈ SIS−A ∃l ∈ FIS−A ∋ lIL ≡ SIENG
where:
• FIS−A is a set of logic expressions of language F .
• l is a logic expression of an English IS-A sentence s.
• IL is interpretation function for F .
• IENG is linguistic interpretation function of SIS−A
4. Approach
4.1. Characterization (Task 1)
For task 1 described in section 3.1 choosing a formal grammar theory is by far the conventional approach taken
in the computational semantics community. The chosen grammar serves as a basis for generating the parse tree of a
sentence. However, generating semantics by applying a particular semantic theory over complicated (although sophis-
ticated) parse trees is computationally expensive. We observed that since our chosen semantic theory is Description
Logics (DL), where concepts are defined in terms of roles and their associations with other concepts (thus, forming
subject-predicate-object triples), the primary objective of sentence parsing should be to identify the subject, predicate,
and object of a sentence. A full-fledged parse tree is not necessary for the case (it is possible that a parse tree based
interpretation can make translation of sentences into equivalent DL expressions even more complicated). Hence,
we developed a pseudo-grammar structure, called characterization template, that captures the intrinsic subject-object
dependency structure in all forms of English factual sentences (simple, complex, and compound). This dependency
generates a unique structure for each of the three forms. The basic form of a subject and an object, in the context
of characterization template, is a 〈DT, NP〉2 structure whereas a predicate can be any one of 〈VB〉, 〈VB, IN〉, 〈VBX,
VB, IN〉3 structures. In general, it can be said that a subject or an object can either exist single or can be associated
with a modifier (an adjective such as beautiful or noun acting as an adjective such as house modifying boat in the
lexicon house boat) and/or quantifier (can be a determiner or a predeterminer such as both or a phrasal equivalent of
a determiner such as any one of ). Such abstraction significantly helps in giving a single and unique semantic inter-
pretation to a group of lexicons acting together either as a modifier or a quantifier rather than composing the semantic
interpretation of individual lexicon over a parse tree.
Characterization template is a pseudo-grammar in several senses: (i) the sequence of the lexicons of the original
sentence can get changed after the characterization process, (ii) lexicons can get normalized into a standard form after
characterization, and (iii) it does not give a generic set of rules to combine or split phrase structures but rather fits in
sentences of equivalent grammatical structure into one fixed template. In section 4.1.1 the characterization template
of each of the three forms of sentences has been discussed at length. The scope of the discussion is limited to IS-A
sentences only.
2DT: Determiner (ex: the, a, an, any); NP: Noun Phrase (ex: intelligent student); (notations according Penn Tree Bank [77])
3VB: Verb (ex: goes, takes); IN: Preposition (ex: by, to, in); VBX: Auxillary Verb (ex: is, be, has); (notations according Penn Tree Bank)
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4.1.1. Characterization Template
The basic characterization template of all IS-A sentences is [S][IS-A][O] where S denotes Subject, O denotes
Object, and IS-A denotes a set of lexicons that are variations of the relation is a kind of. A list of 70 base IS-A lexicons
has been bootstrapped from Wordnet 2.1 [78] and then linguistically validated manually. It can be observed that IS-A
variations can be of four categories: (i) subject hyponymy (ex: “Cat is a kind of animal.”), (ii) subject hypernymy
(ex: “Animal is a category of cat.”), (iii) subject membership (ex: “John is a human.”), (iv) subject commonality (ex:
“Man is like machine.”), and (v) subject qualification (ex: “Students such as John and Joe are clever.”). It can be
observed that is a kind of relation is semantically inverse to is a category of relation. For an example, in the sentence
“Cat is a kind of animal” the subject Cat is a sub class of the object Animal while in the sentence “Animal is a category
of Cat” the subject Animal is now the super class of the object Cat. The last two categories have linguistic subtleties
that is addressed in details in section 4.3.2.
A simple IS-A sentence can be defined as a sentence having only one subject and one object and disallowing
clausal restrictions on either the subject or the object. For an example, the sentence: “John is a good student” is
simple while the sentence: “John and Joe are good students” or the sentence: “John, who is a student, is clever” are
not simple. A simple sentence has the following characterization template:
[[Q1]][[M]∗][S][IS-A][[Q2]][[M]∗][O]
where:
• [[ ]]: double squared brackets indicates optional component
• []∗: indicates multiple consecutive components of same type
• [Q1]: subject quantifier includes variations of the set: {a, an, the, some, all}. We have bootstrapped 116
variations of modifiers in general from WordNet for the proposed OL tool DLOLIS−A .
• [Q2]: object quantifier includes variations of the set: {the, some, all}.
• [M]: subject/object modifier value is restricted to the set: {NN, JJ, RB, VBG}.
• [S ]: subject value is restricted to the set: {NN, NNP, JJ, RB, VBG}4
• [O]: object - value is restricted to the set: {NN, NNP, JJ, RB, VBG}
• [IS − A]: denotes all possible lexical variations.
If any sentence is characterized into the above template then we can say that the sentence is simple in nature.
Complex IS-A sentences are clausal sentences where every clause is in the IS-A form. For example: “A Predator is
an animal that is animal-eater”. In this sentence the clause: “that is animal-eater” is of type IS-A. We can characterize
most forms of a complex IS-A sentence as:
[[X]][S ][[Cl1]][IS − A][[X]][O1][[Cl2]][IS − A][[X]][O2]
where:
• [[X]]: [[Q]][[M]∗]
• [Cl]: signifies IS-A clausal token and all its variations (such as: ‘which’, ‘who’, ‘whose’, ‘where’, ‘that’,
‘when’).
There are certain clausal tokens like ‘being’, ‘seemingly’, ‘looking’, ‘having been’, ‘as’ etc. that have null [Cl]
component. For an example, the complex sentence: “John, being a good student, is hard-working” has [Cl = null]
and [IS −A = being] characterization component. [Cl1] is called the first clause and [Cl2] is called the second clause.
Compound IS-A sentences are IS-A sentences having conjunctive or disjunctive list of the subject and/or the
object. The basic generic format of such sentences can be characterized as:
4NN: Noun; NNP: Proper Noun; JJ: Adjective; RB: Adverb; VBG: Gerund (notations according Penn Tree Bank)
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[[X]][∧S 1..k/ ∨ S 1..k][[Cl1]][IS − A][[X]][∧O11..l/ ∨ O11..l][[Cl2]][IS − A][[X]][∧O21..m/ ∨ O21..m]
where:
• [X] : [[Q]][[M]∗]
• ∧/∨: Disjunctive/Conjunctive operator representing ‘or’/‘and’ and their variations (ex: “either .. or ..”, “as
well as”, etc.)
• ∧Y ∈ S,O: Conjunctive list of subject/object
• ∨Y ∈ S,O: Disjunctive list of subject/object
More complex structures can be recursively characterized as the following case:
[[X]][∧S 1...k/ ∨ S 1..k][[∨/∧]][[∧S k..n/ ∨ S k..n]][IS − A][[X]][∧O1..l/ ∨ O1..l][∨/∧][[∧Ol..m/ ∨ Ol..m]]
An example disjunctive sentence of such format is: ”Cat, dog, and bull are either herbivorous or carnivorous animal.”
4.1.2. DLOLIS−A Characterization Components
In this section we elaborate the architecture and detail the functioning of each sequential components of DLOLIS−A
characterizer. We then outline the characterization algorithm that it follows. The characterizer is connected to three
associative components that act as a preprocessing pipeline: (i) Triple Extractor (ii) Singularizer, and (iii) Normalizer.
In the next three sub-sections we discuss each one of them.
4.1.2.1. Triple Extractor.
The first component in the characterization pipeline is the Triple Extractor. Triple extraction is a sentence simplifi-
cation process that converts complex and compound sentences into a set of simple and/or simpler complex sentences.
For an example, the compound sentence: “John and Joe, who are intelligent students, are student body and greek
house members” can be simplified into the following set of pure complex sentences: (i) “John, who is intelligent
student, is student body leader”, (ii) “John, who is intelligent student, is greek house leader”, (iii) “Joe, who is in-
telligent student, is student body leader”, and (iv) “Joe, who is intelligent student, is greek house leader”. All these
four sentences can be further simplified into simple sentences. For an example, sentence (i) can be simplified into the
sentences: (i.a) “John is intelligent student”, and (i.b) “John is student body leader”. Hence, the original sentence
gets simplified into six distinct simple sentences. Triple extraction being a simplification process helps in easy NL
to DL translation process at a later stage. It is to be noted that there are cases where the extraction process may not
culminate to simple sentences only. If subject or object of a sentence are enumerated in disjunction then the resulting
simplification process output can be a set of simpler complex/compound sentences. For an example, a variation of
the previous sentence: “Either John or Joe, who is good student, is student body member.” will be simplified into two
simpler compound sentences: (i) “Either John or Joe is good student”, and (ii) “Either John or Joe is student body
member”.
The Triple Extractor works through a systematic parsing algorithm that starts by identifying the clausal comma
(if it exists) from where a clause begins for a complex sentence and extracting the portion before it as subject phrase.
If the sentence is not complex then it extracts the portion before the IS-A lexicon as subject phrase. Then it extracts
the object phrase as the portion after the clausal comma where the clausal phrase ends for a complex sentence or
after the IS-A lexicon for compound sentences. After that it checks whether the subject clause is a conjunctive or
disjunctive enumeration of subjects (if at all it is an enumeration). If it is disjunctive it does not break the subject
phrase. Otherwise it breaks the subject phrase into a list of subjects. The same operation is carried out for the object
phrase. Now, the Triple Extractor extracts the clausal phrase (if it exists) by removing the clausal lexicon associated
with it. It then associates each of the subjects in the subject list with this clausal phrase to form a set of complete IS-A
sentences. If the subject phrase is disjunctive then it associates the entire phrase with the clausal phrase to form one
complete IS-A sentence. After associating the subject list/phrase with the clausal phrase it then associates the subject
list/phrase with the object list/phrase. If there are m subjects in the subject list and n objects in the object list then the
Triple Extractor forms m*n complete IS-A sentences (m, n will be equal to 1 in case of disjunctive enumeration).
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A very important subtlety that the Triple Extractor takes special care about is the type of number agreement in
the clausal IS-A lexicon with a disjunctive enumerated subject phrase. If the number agreement is in plural then
the disjunctive nature of the subject phrase needs to be ignored while associating it with the clausal phrase. For an
example, in the sentence: “Either John or Joe, who are good students, is student body member.” both John and Joe
are good student because of the clausal IS-A lexicon are. Hence, the simplification process results in three sentences
(two simple and one compound as opposed to two compound in the previous singular variation of the same sentence):
(i) “John is good student”, (ii) “Joe is good student”, and (iii) “Either John or Joe is student body member”.
Another important aspect that the Triple Extractor handles is the possibility of an object phrase becoming the
secondary subject phrase of a clausal phrase. For an example, in the sentence: “John is a student who is hard-
working”, “student” acts as the first object (O1) of the first subject “John” (S 1) while at the same time acts as the
second subject (S 2) of the second object “hard-working” (O2). Hence, the given sentences get simplified into the
sentences: (i) “John is a hard-working student”, and (ii) “Hard-working student is hard-working”. Note that the
subtlety lies in the fact that the first simplification should not be the sentence: “John is a student” since that leads to
the semantic loss of the fact that John is not just a student but also is hard-working and hence, should belong to the
special class of students who are hard-working (i.e. hard-working student).
4.1.2.2. Singularizer.
Singularization is the next process. In this process the plural forms of subject, object, and predicate are lemma-
tized into their corresponding singular version. For an example, the sentence “Some men are hard working” will be
converted into “Some man is hard working”. It might seem that singularization might lose the grammatical validity
(i.e. number agreement) of the original sentence and hence, might also lose the semantics associated. However, we
claim that this does not happen because of DL being the choice of representation. DL is a variable free representation
in the sense that a DL definition is always about a concept - i.e. an entire class of instances having common properties.
Thus, converting the plural version of a concept (say Men) into its singular version (say Man) does not change the
semantics as in both the cases we still mean the same class of instances.
Under certain cases the singular and plural sense may not be equivalent. For an example, as opposed to the
sentence: “Men are hard working”, in the sentence: ”The men are handsome” we cannot generalize the handsome-
ness to the singularized concept Man. However, the quantifier associated the subject helps us to distinguish the
semantic difference in the two singularied sentences: “Man is hard working” and “Some man is handsome”. Having
an existential quantifier (such as some) with the singularized form of the subject (or the object) simply means that
we are now describing a particular sub-class of the concept (in the previous example it will be the class “Handsome
Man”). Since DL is variable free there is no special need to distinguish the semantic difference of the singular and the
plural cases.
Singularization is necessary to avoid creation of redundant classes (one for the singular version and one for the
plural) having two possibly different interpretations w.r.t the knowledge base. For an example, there might be two
sentences in the corpus, one of which can be as: “Students are intelligent” and another can be as: “Student is diligent”.
Without a singularizer we can unnecessarily create two concepts “Students” and “Student” having two interpretations
for a system following an open world assumption. Our proposed tool, DLOLIS−A , used the Inflect 0.2.3 5, is used to
for the singularization process.
4.1.2.3. Normalizer.
The Normalizer is the third component of the architectural pipeline. The job of the Normalizer is to automatically
identify all lexical variations of [IS − A], [Q] and [Cl] in IS-A sentences. It then translates them into their standard
normal form. Thus, all IS-A variations of subject hyponymy are normalized to the form is and subject hypernymy
variations to is class of. There are two special IS-A cases pertaining to non-trivial IS-A sentences that are normalized
separately. One is subject object equivalency relationship bearing lexicons (7 such cases bootstrapped) which are
normalized to same as. Another one is subject object similarity bearing lexicons (10 such cases bootstrapped) which
are normalized to like. Similarly, all quantifier variations (116 in total) are normalized to either of a, the, some, all or
such as and all clausal variations except for when and where (9 in total) are normalized to that is.
5https://pypi.python.org/pypi/inflect
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There are other types of normalization such as subject normalization and object normalization for IS-A sentences.
For an example, the sentence “John is hard-working” may be normalized into the sentence: “John is diligent” if there
already exists a sentence such as: “Mary is diligent”. This is a case of object normalization where the object lexicon
gets normalized into an already used synonymous lexicon. Such normalization is done via WordNet look-ups on
the fly. Normalization is necessary because the final goal of the characterizer is to generate a single equivalent DL
expression for sentences that have same semantics although different lexical variations of [IS − A], [Cl]&[Q]. For
an example, the sentence “John happens to be a good student” and the sentence “Mary, as a student, is good” get
normalized to the sentence: “John is a good student” and “Mary, that is a student, is good” respectively before getting
characterized. This ensures a standardized DL translation to take place at a later stage. A thorough discussion on the
entire normalization procedure is beyond the scope of this paper.
4.1.2.4. Characterizer.
The Characterizer incorporates a Part-Of-Speech (POS) tagger component (developed using the Stanford POS
Tagger API 6) that helps in identifying the linguistic categories of the lexicons in a given IS-A sentence. The normal-
ized IS-A lexicon is first extracted. The phrase that appears before the extracted IS-A lexicon constitute the subject
while the phrase that appears after constitute the object for a simple sentence. Once the subject phrase is extracted out
the corresponding modifier and quantifier of the phrase is identified. Similar processing is done on the object phrase.
Lexicon that is identified as a foreign word by the POS tagger (i.e. type is FW) is assumed by the characterization
algorithm to be a noun (NN) and the tag is converted to NN accordingly. The assumption holds strong since we
are dealing with IS-A sentences where there will exist an English IS-A phrase that guarantees the requirement of a
predicate in the given sentence thereby rendering the foreign word to be either a noun (NN) or proper noun (NNP) or
gerund (VBG). We will see in later section that assuming these three possibilities as NN will not result in semantic
loss from a conceptual knowledge point of view.
4.2. Description Logic as Formal Language (Task 2)
In our approach we choose the formal language F to be Description Logics (DL). As mentioned earlier we argue
that most factual IS-A sentences have expressive equivalency in the DL language: AL[U][E][C][H][O](D) where:
• AL: Attributive Language supports atomic concept definition, concept intersection, full value restriction,
limited role restriction, and atomic concept negation.
• [U]: Union supports concept union
• [E]: Existential supports full role restriction
• [C]: Complement supports concept negation
• [H]: Role Hierarchy supports inclusion axioms of roles
• [O]: Nominal supports concept creation of unrecognized Named Entity
• (D): Data Type supports range concepts to be data type
The choice of DL over other semantic representation theories has several reasons: (i) DL is equivalent to L2
fragment of FOPL and hence, is decidable [79], (ii) DL representation is compact and variable-free as compared to
representations such as DRS [74] and LFT [80] making it comparatively easy to parse, (iii) the DL sub-language
AL[U][E][C][H][O](D) is tractable since we observed that most IS-A sentence interpretation is covered by AL[U]
[O](D), (iv) highly optimized semantic tableau based DL reasoners are available as compared to slower hyper-
resolution based theorem provers used in DRS or LFT based reasoning [81, 82], (v) DL has direct mapping with
the W3C recommended OWL format for web ontology7 Expressions in DL can represent two types of sentences: (i)
general facts such as “Most students are intelligent” (T-Box definitions or inclusion axioms), and (ii) specific facts
such as “John is a student” (A-Box assertions). Every A-Box assertion must have a T-Box induction. For an example,
for the previous assertion the corresponding induction will be “Some men are students” assuming we have correctly
recognized the named entity John to be Man. More about T-Box induction is in section 4.3.
6http://nlp.stanford.edu/software/tagger.shtml
7OWL DL is equivalent to SHOIN(D) while OWL 2 is equivalent SROIQ(D).
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4.3. DL Translation (Task 3)
In this section we elaborate on the NL to DL translation rules. We divide such translation rules into two categories:
(i) rules for trivial IS-A sentences described in section 4.3.1, and (ii) rules for non-trivial IS-A sentences described in
section 4.3.2 .
4.3.1. Trivial IS-A Sentence Translation
Trivial IS-A sentences are those sentences that can be translated into equivalent DL expressions using basic inclu-
sion axiom (of the form Subject ⊑ Object; Subject ⊒ Object) without: (i) modification to the core inclusion axiom,
and (ii) any loss of semantics during translation. In a more general sense, such IS-A sentences have only one linguistic
reading and need no lexical modification of the subject phrase or the object phrase during translation. Since, there is
only one linguistic reading translation is straightforward. For an example, the sentence: “Some men are intelligent
beings.” has only one reading. It also requires no lexical modification during the translation process. It is to be noted
that singularization of subject and object phrases does occur but during the characterization phase. Hence, the actual
normalized sentence to be translated is: “Some man is a intelligent being”.
Translation rules for trivial sentences can be further divided into three categories: (i) rules for simple trivial IS-A
sentences as described in section 4.3.1.1, (ii) rules for complex trivial IS-A sentences as described in section 4.3.1.2,
and (iii) rules for compound trivial IS-A sentences as described in section 4.3.1.3.
4.3.1.1. Simple Trivial IS-A Sentence.
The DL translation process works on the following characterization template of a normalized simple trivial sen-
tence (section 4.1.1):
[[Q1]][[M]∗][S ][IS − A][[Q2]][[M]∗][O]
All kinds of simple trivial IS-A sentences are either subject hypernymy/hyponymy statements ex: “Man is an animal”)
or subject membership statements (ex: “John is a man”). In case 1 and case 2 we limit our discussion to non-
quantified and non-modified subject/object phrasal sentences. We deal with quantifier and modifier in case 3 and case
4 respectively.
CASE 1 (subject membership): Membership can happen only when the S is an NNP (Proper Noun) and the O is
a NN (Noun). This is because of: (i) there cannot be a named instance of a concept which is either a VBG (Gerund)
or an RB (adverb) or a JJ (adjective), and (ii) the O cannot be NNP unless the IS-A variation is a subject hypernymy
such as the sentence: “Carnivorous animal includes Kitty.” (where Kitty is a cat), in which case the membership rela-
tion is inversed. If both S and O is NNP then the IS-A variation essentially means is same as (also called equivalent
statements). Example equivalent sentence is “John is known as Joe.” This is a particular kind of non-trivial sentence
and will be discussed in section 4.3.2.4. Since membership sentences are assertive therefore, the corresponding DL
A-Box assertion is:
A-Box Rule (Membership):
If [S = NNP][IS − A][O] Then
O(S)
([‘O’ + WordNet.getMSP(S)])(S)
WordNet.getMSP is the method for extracting the most common parent from the WordNet v2.1 lexicon. Before
we can explain rule 2 for A-Box addition we first need to explain the corresponding T-Box induction.
T-Box Induction Rule (Membership):
If [S = NNP] Then
[‘O’+ WordNet.getMSP(S)] ⊑ O
[‘O’+ WordNet.getMSP(S)] ⊑ WordNet.getMSP(S)
The concept labeling of the induced subject follows the conventional semantics of concatenation for the + operator
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while a literal in [‘ ’] implies a lexicon. For an example, in the sentence: “John is a student.” the following con-
cept labeling for the induced subject concept will be generated assuming the most specific parent of John is Person:
[‘Student’+ ‘Person’] = StudentPerson
While rule (1) shows the induced subject hyponymy relation in the T-Box rule (2) shows that it is a particular
sub-class of the most specific parent class of the subject instance (in our case StudentPerson being a sub-class of
Person). Going back to rule (2) of A-Box addition we can now see that the subject instance (John in our example)
should belong to this induced subject concept (i.e. StudentPerson). It is to be noted that the WordNet.getMSP method
may not always return a result. In such cases for T-Box induction the subject instance is induced as a subject nominal
(i.e. O of DL). The following T-Box induction rule is valid in such case:
T-Box Induction Rule (membership):
[‘O’ + {‘S’}] ⊑ ‘O’
[‘O’ + {‘S’}] ⊑ {‘S’}
CASE 2 (subject hypernymy/hyponymy): When subject/object is not NNP then depending upon the nature of the
IS-A lexicon (i.e. whether hyponymy of normalized type is a or hypernymy of normalized type is class of ) we can
have two T-box rules:
T-Box Rule (Subject Hyponymy):
If [S = NN/VBG][IS − A][O = NN/VBG] Then
S ⊑ O
T-Box Rule (Subject Hypernymy):
If [S = NN/VBG][isaclasso f ][O = NN/VBG] Then
S ⊒ O
CASE 3.1.1 (plural subject some/the quantification): When subject has a quantifier of the type some8 or the (as-
suming the subject to be of type NNplural) then we need to make a special sub-class of the subject concept. The labeling
of this sub-concept depends on the associated object concept. For an example, in the sentence: “Some women are
smokers.” we need to create a class of women who smokes and for that we label the class as SmokerWoman (singu-
larized). The general labeling rule for subject quantification is [‘O’+‘S’]=OS. The T-Box rule for some type subject
quantifier is as follows:
T-Box Rule (Subject Some/The Quantification):
If [Q = some/the][S = NNplural][IS − A][O = NN] Then
[‘O’+‘S’] ⊑ S
[‘O’+‘S’] ⊑ O
An interesting observation in the case of quantifier is that there is a wide range of semantic variation in terms
of degree of cardinality for all the possible quantifiers. For an example, the quantifier not much usually means low
degree of cardinality as compared to the quantifier quite a lot which means high degree of cardinality. The quantifiers
some and the, on the other hand, are non-committing in terms of degree of cardinality. However, all such modifiers
are contextual in terms of their semantics since quite a lot in some cases can be anything greater than, say, 2000 units
while in some other cases can be as low as, say, 20 units. Also, quantifier semantics is completely subjective as well
and depends upon the reader’s perspective. This semantic non-triviality of quantifiers cannot be represented in DL (or
in general by any model theoretic logical formalism).9. The Characterizer normalizes all forms of some type quan-
tifiers into the neutral quantifier some. Therefore, the sentence: “Nearly all men are student.” will be normalized by
the characterizer as “Some man is student” (singularization included). Although it seems that considerable semantic
loss is taking place in this process yet on close observation one can understand that in reality there will be no loss.
8We have enlisted a variation list of size 703 which again has been generated from an iterative bootstrapping process over WordNet.
9DL does have number restrictions (N ,Q) but on the roles (i.e. relations). However, in the context of modifiers this is not relevant
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A sentence such as before when gets translated into the inclusion axioms: StudentMan ⊑ Student; StudentMan ⊑
Man a reference to the original sentence is not lost. Therefore, the subject StudentMan is linked with the original
subject Nearly all men and any future reasoning on the knowledge base will in fact refer to this link during knowledge
discovery or question answering. Degree of cardinality matters only in the A-Box where queries on cardinality can
be given to the learned ontology. Since quantifiers of some type quantifies subject concept and not subject instance
no A-Box assertions are made. Also, during populating the learned ontology with instances we cannot say that if
x number of instances are inserted consistently in any subject concept S then we have achieved a high/low/neutral
intensity and hence, should consider the insertion of (x + 1)th instance in the same subject concept to be inconsistent
w.r.t the T-Box. It is because of these reasons that DLOLIS−A ignores the quantification degree of IS-A sentences.
CASE 3.1.2 (singular subject some/the quantification): It is to be noted that there is a small subtlety required to be
addressed in the treatment of the quantifier the with the subject. When the original subject is in plural form then the
is semantically equivalent to some. Hence, the gets normalized to some during the characterisation phase. However,
if the subject is originally in singular form, then the refers to a particular subject instance and not a subject concept.
For an example, in the sentence: “The woman is a student.” the subject is a particular unlabeled woman belonging to
the induced subject concept StudentWoman. In that case an A-Box translation is required as per the following rule:
A-Box Rule (Singular Subject the Quantification):
If [Q = the][S = NNsing][IS − A][O = NN] Then
[‘O+S’]([‘S N’])
Here N stands for the Nth occurrence of “the S” in the corpus. For an example, if “the woman” happens to be the 7th
occurrence then it is labeled as woman 7 and becomes a member of the induced concept StudentWoman. The current
scope of the paper does not include issues related to anaphoric ambiguity and resolution of this subject instance. The
corresponding T-Box induction rule is as follows:
T-Box Induction Rule (Singular Subject the Quantification):
If [Q = the][S = NNsing][IS − A][O = NN] Then
[‘O’+‘S’] ⊑ S
[‘O’+‘S’] ⊑ O
CASE 3.2 (subject all quantification): In case when subject has a quantifier of type all10 (assuming the subject to
be of type NN) we do not have to make the special sub-class. The corresponding T-Box induction rule is:
T-Box Rule (Subject All Quantification):
If [Q = all][S = NN][IS − A][O = NN] Then
S ⊑ O
CASE 3.3 (subject no quantification): In case when subject has a quantifier of type no (assuming the subject to be
of type NN) need to make the subject concept disjoint from the object concept. The corresponding T-Box induction
rule is:
T-Box Rule (Subject No Quantification):
If [Q = no][S = NN][IS − A][O = NN] Then
S ⊑ ¬O
CASE 3.4 (object some/the, all, no quantification): In case when the object is quantified by some all the 3 rules for
subject quantification is valid for the object. But the rules need modifications in terms of labeling of the object concept.
This is so because some acts as a indefinite determiner rather than a quantifier with a sense of degree of cardinality
1017 variations of all have been bootstrapped from WordNet.
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(unlike subject quantification by some). For an example, in the sentence: “The activists are some students.” we are
referring to a special and indefinite group of students as objects who are activists. Therefore, to be more precise we
cannot label the subject as StudentActivist.
To solve the above problem we first label the indefinite object as Student N where N denotes a numerical value.
The numerical value corresponds to the current count (i.e. Nth occurrence) of some students as observed in the corpus
so far. This is required because although we know that some implies a particular sub-class of the object concept some
together with a particular object concept (say, some students) can refer to distinctly different (indefinite) sub-classes
as and when the context of the sentence changes (i.e. as the subject concept changes). For an example, in the two
sentences: “The movie stars are some rich people.” and “The businessmen are some rich people.” it may be so that the
subject concept of movie stars who are rich may not belong to the same sub-class of rich people as the the sub-class
of rich people that the subject concept of businessmen who are rich belongs to. After the object concept is labeled the
subject concept is labeled as Student NActivist. Then the following T-Box rule is applied:
T-Box Rule (Object Some/The Quantification):
If [S = NN][IS − A][Q = some/the][O = NN] Then
[‘ON’+‘S’] ⊑ S
[‘ON’+‘S’] ⊑ ON
ON ⊑ O
T-Box Rule (Object All Quantification):
If [S = NN][IS − A][Q = all][O = NN] Then
S ⊑ O
T-Box Rule (Object No Quantification):
If [S = NN][IS − A][Q = no][O = NN] Then
S ⊑ ¬O
There can be two cases when we allow the object to be quantified: (i) the subject remains un-quantified, and (ii)
the subject is also quantified. In case when the no type quantifier is associated with both the subject concept and the
object concept then they cancel their negation effect out and the translation rule is equivalent to the case where all
type is associated with both the subject concept and the object concept. Therefore, there can be 35 (i.e. (6x6) - 1)
cases of simple trivial IS-A sentence quantification.
CASE 4 (subject/object modification): Normally, if a modifier in simple IS-A sentence is a JJ or an NN then it
modifies either an NN or an NNP. As an example, in the sentence: “Wild cat is a mammal” the JJ Wild modifies the
subject concept Cat which is a NN. In such general cases it is evident that the concept WildCat is a sub concept of the
concept Cat and also is a sub concept of the concept Mammal.
An interesting phenomenon that can be observed for subject/object modification is what we term as recursive
nested modification. In sentences where the subject modification is by a sequence of modifiers such as [M1][M2][M3][S ]
[IS − A][O] then a nested structure is assumed as: [M1]([M2]([M3]([S ])))[IS − A][O]. Here ’()’ denotes scope of the
modifier. Therefore, the scope of the inner most nested modifier M3 is the subject concept S. The scope of the modifier
M2 is the sub-concept M3S formed as a result of the M3 modifying S. At the same time M2 also recursively modifies S
to form the sub-concept M2S . Similarly M1 has the sub-concept M2 M3S as scope of modification while in recursion
modifies M3S and S. The T-Box rule for such recursive nested modification is as follows:
T-Box Rule (Recursive Nested Modification for 3-level nesting):
M1S ⊑ S
M2 M1S ⊑ M1S
M2 M1S ⊑ M2S
Another interesting phenomenon with subject/object modification is what we term as backward modification. In
some cases it is not only the modifier that modifies the associated subject/object in the forward direction but also gets
modified by the subject/object as well in the backward direction. This may happen only for the form [M = NN][S ].
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For an example, in the sentence: “House boat is a kind of vessel.” the modifier House also gets modified by the
subject Boat and hence, the subject concept HouseBoat is a sub-class of both the concepts House and Boat apart from
being a sub-class of the object concept Vessel. However, such backward modification is not necessarily true for all
phrases of form [M = NN][S ]. For an example, in the sentence: “Sea plane is an air vehicle” the subject modifier
concept Sea is not modified by the concept Plane so as to form the concept SeaPlane as a sub-class of the concept Sea
(although the forward modification is always valid). Similarly, the same holds for the object modifier in this example.
This might be treated as one of the non-triviality of factual sentences in general and IS-A sentences in specific.
Backward modification is currently not implemented in DLOLIS−A although an approach to solve this problem can be
to verify the possibility using a third party lexicon such as WordNet and check whether, for an example, SeaPlane has
hyponymy with Sea.
4.3.1.2. Complex Trivial IS-A Sentence.
The semantic interpretation of complex trivial IS-A sentences depends on the dependency structure of the clausal
tokens of type “that”. T-Box rules are as follows:
CASE 1 ([S ][IS − A][O1][IS − A][O2]): This is an ambiguous form since it is difficult to determine the subject
that is constrained by the clausal phrase. Also, the linguistic validity of the sentence can be debated as well. Under
such circumstances we will assume that the linguistic semantics of the form is the same as the next form.
CASE 2 ([S ][IS − A][O1][That][IS − A][O2]): The position of the clausal token in this form makes the primary
object concept O1 the secondary subject concept of the clausal phrase while S remains the primary subject concept
for O1. A clause has a modifying effect on its subject since it restricts the subject’s scope to a particular type. For an
example, in the sentence: “Cat is an animal that is a carnivorous mammal.” the clause that modifies its subject Animal
by restricting it to be of type CarnivorousMammal. Hence, the primary object concept O1 needs to be modified first
before subject concept can be included within O1. In the above example, the primary object concept Animal gets
converted into the modified primary object concept CarnivorousMammalAnimal. It is to be noted that the modifying
effect of the second clause on its subject (i.e. on the primary object) may not always be true. For an example, in
the sentence: “Cat is a feline that is an animal” the clause which is not really particularizing the secondary subject
concept Feline but rather adding some more information about it. In other words, by creating the modified concept
AnimalFeline we are not creating a sub-class of the concept Feline at all. AnimalFeline and Feline are equivalent
semantically in this case. This is truly a non triviality which is quite interesting to observe. To identify such cases is
computationally challenging since it can only be understood through apriori knowledge that whether the secondary
subject concept is at all modifiable by the clausal phrase. In the current scope of the paper DLOLIS−A does not strive
to make such identification and takes a ‘play safe’ strategy where it does create a modified secondary subject con-
cept. This is safe since adding a new (although unnecessary) subject concept will not make the T-Box and A-Box
inconsistent since in an open world assumption the modified secondary subject concept might also be equivalent to
the original secondary subject concept unless proved to be otherwise. The corresponding T-Box rule is:
T-Box Rule (Secondary Clausal Modification: No Object 1 Modifier/Quantifier):
[‘O2’ + ‘O1’] ⊑ O2
S ⊑ [‘O2’ +‘O1’]
T-Box Rule (Secondary Clausal Modification + Object 1 Modifier):
[‘O2’+‘M’+‘O1’] ⊑ O2
[‘O2’+‘M’+‘O1’] ⊑ [‘M’+ ‘O1’] ⊑ O1
S ⊑ [‘O2’+‘M’ +‘O1’]
T-Box Rule (Secondary Clausal Modification + Object 1 Quantifier):
[‘O2’+‘O1’] ⊑ O2
[‘O2’+‘O1’] ⊑ O1
S ⊑ [‘O2’+ ‘O1’]
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CASE 3 ([S ][That][IS − A][O1][IS − A][O2]): The position of the clausal token in this form makes S the sub-
ject concept of both the clauses. Example sentence is: “A cat that is Persian is long-haired.” The corresponding rule is:
T-Box Rule (Modifier/Quantifier Free):
S ⊑ O1
S ⊑ O2
Rules for first object modifier/quantifier follow the same principle as the previous form.
CASE 4 ([S ][That][IS − A][O1][That][IS − A][O2]): This form is linguistically invalid since both the clausal
phrases are unsaturated in semantics.
OTHER CASES: It is to be observed that there are certain clausal tokens that are not of type that. Such clausal
tokens can be classified into four types: (i) temporal (or when type), (ii) spatial (or where type), (iii) counter-factual
(or “although. . . yet” type), and (iv) exemplificative (or such as type). Temporal clauses do not represent the present
ontological status. In some sense it modifies the is a lexicon rather than the subject concept. For an example, in the
sentence: “John was a student when he was young.” the clausal token when does not modify the secondary subject
concept Student. Instead it adds a temporal constraint to the ontological validity of John stating that John had to be
young in order to have existed as a student. In other words, John was a student who was young (i.e. a young student).
The solution of this second non-triviality is to normalize the sentence, for an example in the previous case, into “John
was a young student.”. However, if the second subject (in this case he which is John) is not the same as the first subject
then such a solution will not hold. For an example, in the sentence: “John was a student when Elizabeth was queen.”
the second subject concept Elizabeth is not the same as the first subject concept John. This sentence is semantically
equivalent to the sentence: “John was a student at the same time when Elizabeth was queen.” where when imposes
a temporal constraint on the ontological validity of John being a student. These sentences are, however, not purely
IS-A in nature. The DL representation of such sentences is left as a future work. Although the representational issue
of temporal modal constraint on is a is resolved in this manner yet another non-triviality appears due to past or future
tense reference of is a enforced by when. Past or future ontological status creates a type of ontological ambiguity that
has been discussed in section 4.3.2. (Case 1 & 2).
Spatial clauses have a very unique characteristic. They cannot be applied for purely IS-A sentences. This is
because of two reasons: (a) as the first clause (see section 4.1.1) in the characterization template of complex sentences
they cannot modify the primary subject, and (b) as the second clause (see section 4.1.1) in the characterization template
they cannot modify the primary object. For an example, in the sentence, “India, where the Taj Mahal is, is culturally
vibrant.” in the first clausal phrase “where Taj Mahal is” the first clause where is not modifying the subject concept of
an IS-A phrase (the first phrase can be reformulated as “where Taj Mahal is located”). Again, in the sentence: “John
is a student where he is also a TA.” the second clause where is not modifying Student. However, the second clausal
phrase is also not pure IS-A in nature. This is because the original sentence can be reformulated as the sentence:
“John is a student at place X where John is also a TA” which can be broken further into two simpler sentences: “John
is a student at place X” and “John is a TA at place X”. Each of these simpler sentences is not purely IS-A in type.
Counter-factual clauses of type “although. . . yet. . . ” does not add any new semantics from a T-Box point of view.
This is because the fact that follows although is not nullified by the fact that follows yet. For an example, in the
sentence: “Although John is a student [yet] he is a teacher” the fact that John is a member of the primary object
concept Student remains unchanged even after the addition of the new fact that John is a member of the secondary
object concept Teacher as well. So this case can be treated in the same way as how we treat that type of clauses.
Exemplificative clauses of type such as needs special treatment. This is not only because such as has several
several lexical variations but also structural variations. We discuss such as type clauses as case 5.
CASE 5 (“Such As” Problem): The IS-A variation such as and its positional variations [9] pose two very inter-
esting semantic deviations. In some sense such as behaves like a modifier to the subject concept of a IS-A sentence.
It is in respect to this behavior that such as can come in two flavors: (i) conjunctive and (ii) disjunctive. An example
of conjunctive form is the sentence: “Boys, such as John and Joe, are students.” Its disjunctive variation will be the
sentence: “Boys, such as John or Joe, are students.” In both the cases we are not talking about the entire concept
Boy being sub concept of the concept Student. But in the conjunctive form both John and Joe should belong to the
restricted concept of Boy while in the disjunctive form either John or Joe have to belong to the restricted concept Boy.
Hence, the distinction between the two cases is given in the following rule:
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T-Box Rule for [S ][suchas][{∧O1i}][IS − A][O2]
[{‘O1i’}+‘S’] ⊑ O2
[{‘O1i’}+‘S’] ⊑ S
The label of the subject concept for the conjunctive form includes the labels of the exemplificative nouns as pre-
fixes. For an example, in the previous sentence the subject concept label will be JohnJoeBoy. This is to make the
subject concept JohnJoeBoy as a special sub-class of the concept Boy. In the given example, the corresponding axiom
will be:
JohnJoeBoy ⊑ S tudent
JohnJoeBoy ⊑ Boy
The corresponding A-Box assertion rule, if the exemplifications are proper nouns (i.e. NNP), is as follows:
A-Box Rule for [S ][suchas][{∧O1i}][IS − A][O2]:
[{‘O1i’}+‘S’](O1i)
In our given example the assertions will be:
JohnJoeBoy(John)
JohnJoeBoy(Joe)
T-Box Rule for [S ][suchas][{∨O1i}][IS − A][O2]:
[‘O11’+‘S’]⊔ . . .⊔[‘O1n’+‘S’] ⊑ ‘O2’
[‘O11’+‘S ’]⊔ . . .⊔[‘O1n’+‘S’] ⊑ S
In the given example, the corresponding axiom will be:
(JohnBoy⊔ JoeBoy) ⊑ S tudent
(JohnBoy⊔ JoeBoy) ⊑ Boy
A-Box Rule for [S ][suchas][{∨O1i}][IS − A][O2]:
[‘O1i’+‘S’](O1i)
In our given example the assertions will be:
JohnBoy(John)
JoeBoy(Joe)
4.3.1.3. Compound Trivial IS-A Sentence.
As discussed in section 4.1.2.1 compound sentences are simplified by the Triple Extractor into simpler sentences
(i.e. simple and/or complex sentences). However, when the subject/object concept is a disjunctive enumeration then
the simplification process may result in some compound sentences as well. As in the example given in section 4.1.2.1
(i.e. the sentence: “Either John or Joe, who are good students, is student body member.”) we get a resultant com-
pound sentence “Either John or Joe is student body member.” Hence, we need to address only the disjunctive case for
compound sentences. The corresponding rules are as follows:
T-box Rule for [∨S 1...k][IS − A][O]: The sentence semantics is same as the form [ANYOF][S i][IS − A][O] and
follows the T-Box rule: ⊔S i ⊑ O. The compounded subject concept is labeled according to following rule:
[⊔S i] := [‘S 1’+‘UNION’+‘S 2’+‘UNION’+. . .+‘S n’]
T-box Rule for [S ][IS − A][∨O1...l]: The sentence semantics is same as the form [S ][IS − A][ANYOF][O j] and
follows the T-Box rule: S ⊑ ⊔O j.
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Rules for all other variations can be derived from these rules.
4.3.2. Non-Trivial IS-A Sentence Translation
We have identified 42 significant non-trivial categories that can be observed in factual IS-A sentences in English
(Table A.2). Some of these categories may have sub categories as well. We discuss each of them in the following
sub-sections.
4.3.2.1. Subject Object Dependency Problem.
A very important nuance of English language that significantly reduces the number of valid structures is the mutual
dependency of the subject and the object. In IS-A sentences there are some kinds of pairs that can never occur together
in terms of linguistic validity. Some examples are listed below:
• [S = NNP][IS − A][O = RB]− A named entity cannot be a member of an adverb.
• [S = RB][IS − A][O = NNP] An adverb cannot be a class of or same as a named entity.
• [S = NNP][IS − A][O = VBG] A named entity cannot be a member of an activity.
• [S = VBG][IS − A][O = NNP] An activity cannot be a class of a named entity.
• [S = JJ][IS − A][O = RB] An adjective cannot be a sub class or class of an adverb.
• [S = JJ][IS − A][O = VBG] An adjective cannot be a sub class or class of an activity
We hereby see that out of a total of 25 core structural possibilities 6 are eliminated. This leads to a total elimination
of 3600 structures (out of 15,000 structures).
4.3.2.2. Object Reification Problem.
In many valid structures it is difficult to directly transform the sentences into their equivalent DL form. This
happens when the object concept assumes the form: [O ∈ {JJ, RB}] while the subject concept assumes the form:
[S ∈ {NN, NNP, VBG}]. For an example, the sentence: “Mary is beautiful” does not mean that Mary is a member
of the concept Beautiful. To solve this problem we introduce two primitive concepts: (i) Attribute (for JJ and RB)
and (ii) Activity (for VBG). All types of JJ and RB are sub concepts of the primitive concept Attribute. Similarly
all types of VBG are sub concepts of the primitive concept Activity. Each of these two primitives has two associ-
ated primitive roles for which they act as fillers: (i) hasState (for Attribute) and (ii) does (for Activity). The second
primitive role will not be required for IS-A sentences though. We then apply a general reification rule for structure
[S = NN/NNP][IS − A][O = JJ/RB] as follows:
T-Box Rule 1 (Object Reification):
S ⊏ [‘O’+ ‘Thing’]
[‘O’+ ‘Thing’] ≡ ∀ hasState.O
O ⊑ Attribute
Similarly, for the structure [S = VBG][IS − A][O = JJ/RB] the following rule is applied:
T-Box Rule 2 (Object Reification):
S ⊑ [‘O’+‘Activity’]
[‘O’+‘Activity’] ⊑ Activity
4.3.2.3. Gerund Problem.
When gerunds (VBG) act as modifiers the rule for recursive nested modification cannot be applied as it is. This is
because in structures such as [M = VBG][S = NN][IS − A][O] the modification may not always be in the forward
direction. For an example, in the sentence “Playing soccer is healthy” the VBG modifier Playing is not modifying
Soccer since the concept PlayingSoccer cannot be sub concept of the concept Soccer. Instead, it is the concept Soc-
cer that is modifying the concept Playing where SoccerPlaying is a kind of Playing. However, in another example
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sentence “Running water is beautiful” the forward modification rule holds true. The underlying ambiguity is very
difficult to clarify since, unless mentioned, there is no way to understand whether the NN is an actor of the VBG or is
acted upon (where the action is the VBG). In the previous example Soccer is not playing but is played. While in the
second example, Water runs. We treat such sentences as follows:
T-Box Rule (Gerund Problem):
[‘M’+‘S’] ⊑ O
[‘M’+‘S’] ⊑ (M ⊔ S)
4.3.2.4. Equivalence Problem.
Some of the same as variations (7 enlisted) are essentially DL equivalent axioms. For such cases the correspond-
ing T-Box rule is as follows:
T-Box rule (Equivalence Problem):
S ≡ O
It is to be noted that the type category (i.e. POS) of S and O must be same for this case to be valid. If the type
of subject-object is NNP then the lexicon is is semantically equivalent to same as. For an example, in the sentence:
“John is known as Joe.” we are stating that another identity of John is Joe. A related non-triviality is the case where
the object is a lexical variation of same. For an example, in the sentence: “Egg-plant and brinjal are same.” the two
subject concepts Egg-plant and Brinjal are not individually hyponyms of the reified object concept SameThing since
that would not equate the two subjects to be same. Hence, such sentence structures are normalized into the form:
“Egg-plant same as Brinjal” and then treated as discussed in this section.
4.3.2.5. Similarity Problem.
The IS-A variation like and its variants (10 bootstrapped from WordNet) pose a very interesting problem since its
linguistic semantics is not exactly same as either is a or same as. For an example, a sentence such as “Tangerine is like
orange” does not imply that the concept Tangerine is either equivalent to or sub concept of the concept Orange. What
it means is that the subject concept Tangerine and the object concept Orange share some common characteristics and
can be grouped under one concept representing the commonality. The corresponding rule is:
T-Box Rule (Subject-Object Similarity):
S ⊑ [‘O’+‘Like’]
O ⊑ [‘O’+‘Like’]
The non-triviality of object being a lexical variation of alike can be seen in this case as well. A similar kind of
sentence normalization is done as in section 4.3.2.4. An example sentence is: “Tangerin and orange are similar.”.
4.3.2.6. Subject Hypernymy-Holonymy Ambiguity.
There are certain cases where the inverse IS-A relations of type includes do not mean subject concept hypernymy.
For an example, in the sentence: “School includes students and teachers” the subject concept School is not a super-
class of the object concepts Student and Teacher. This is rather the case of aggregation (i.e. holonymy) where School
is an aggregate of Teachers and Students. However, from a structural point of view this semantic deviation from the
usual sense of inclusion is not apparent. To resolve this ambiguity we verify the assumed hypernymy in WordNet
and if no support is found then we accept the semantics to be subject holonymy. In case it is holonymic in nature
then the sentence, strictly speaking, is not an IS-A sentence. Although not pertinent to the scope of this paper the
corresponding T-Box rule will be:
T-Box Rule (Subject Holonymy):
S = ∀include+.O
Here ‘+’ represents role transitivity and include is a primitive role representing holonymy. All other variations of
holonymy are normalized into the primitive role include. Here we use the value restriction on include instead of full
existential role restriction because we assume a stricter sense of the filler and update this filler as and when required.
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4.3.2.7. ONLY Problem. The quantifier only can be found in the following three structures:
[S ][IS − A][O][ONLY]
[ONLY][S ][IS − A][O]
[S ][IS − A][T HE][ONLY][O]
We deal with each of these case by case as follows:
CASE 1 (object only quantification): In the first structure the subject S has to be either a member or a sub-concept
of the object concept O and nothing else. Hence, the following rule has to be made:
T-Box Rule (Object ONLY Quantifier):
S ⊑ O
(S ⊓ ¬O) ≡ ⊥
CASE 2 (subject only quantification): In the second structure no concept other than S is a sub-concept of the object
concept O. Hence, the following rule has to be made:
T-Box Rule (Subject ONLY Quantifier):
S ⊑ O
CASE 3 (the only quantification): In the third structure both the above has to hold. Hence, the following T-Box
rule has to be made:
T-Box Rule (Subject-Object ONLY Quantifier):
S ≡ O
(S ⊓ ¬O) ≡ ⊥
4.3.2.8. Numerical Object Modifier Problem.
There can be some factual IS-A sentences where the modifier of the object concepts are numerical in nature. For
an example, in the sentence: “John is 5 ft. tall.” the object concept tall is modified by the numerical adjective 5 ft.
Such sentences need special treatment in terms of representation in DL. Before we come with a DL translation rule
such sentences are first normalized into their corresponding purely lexical form. In case of the previous example, the
normalized sentence will be: “John is five foot tall.” After the normalization of the object concept the following T-Box
rule is applied:
T-Box Rule (Numerical Object Modifier):
If OisNN Then
S = O ⊓ ∀hasDim.(Dimension ⊓ ∀hasValue.Integer ⊓ ∀hasUnit.Unit)
In this case we introduce a new kind of base concept hasDim and its corresponding filler primitive concept Dimen-
sion. In IS-A sentences the numerical modifier represents some kind of dimension (ex: Height, Length, etc.) We have
bootstrapped 9 number of such dimensions where each dimension is a sub-concept of Dimension. Every dimension is
associated with a unit for which we introduce the primitive concept Unit and a corresponding primitive role hasUnit.
There can be several kinds of unit (i.e. sub-concepts of Unit) such as Feet, Meter, Years, Celcius, Degree, Meter/sec,
Second, Abstract Unit,11 etc. We bootstrapped 18 number of such core units (excluding sub types of a particular unit
such as Centimeter etc.). In the previous example, the induced T-Box definition will be:
FiveFootTallPerson = TallThing ⊓ ∀hasHeight.(Height ⊓ ∀hasUnit.(Feet ⊓ ∀hasValue.Integer))
The corresponding A-Box rule is:
11Abstract Unit is a non-numerical unit for Quality dimensions such as Beauty, Intelligence, Emotion (Happiness, Excitement, etc)
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FiveFootTallPerson(John)
Height(HJohn)
hasHeight(John, HJohn)
Feet( f tJohn)
hasUnit(HJohn, f tJohn)
hasValue( f tJohn, 5)
It is to be noted that to infer the sub-type of the dimension in a given IS-A sentence we have created a mapping
table that maps adjectives having dimensions (called dimensional adjectives) to their corresponding dimensions. For
an example, Tall is mapped to Height. This is done through a bootstrapping process where a representative bag of
seed dimensional adjectives are collected from the 9 dimensions (i.e. Length, Width, Height, Number, Temperature,
Speed, Time, Distance, Quality) and then extending them using the WordNet lexicon. We and then extending them
using the WordNet lexicon. We collected 47 dimensional adjectives in total. A full study of extraction of dimensional
adjectives and their mapping is important, although, beyond the scope of the paper.
4.3.2.9. Superlative & Comparative Object Modifier.
In some factual IS-A sentences we might observe superlative tokens. An example sentence is: “John is the tallest
student.”. The object modifiers of such sentences are measurable in terms of their dimension. In the example Tall
is a measurable modifier (or dimensional adjective as discussed in previous sub-section) whose superlative form is
maximum Height of all instances of the modified object concept TallStudent. Sometimes such dimensional adjec-
tives are preceded by keywords such as most and least. Such keywords are good indicators of deciding whether the
superlative form is a maximum (called positive dimensional adjective) or minimum (called negative dimensional ad-
jective). However, for suffix based superlative tokens (i.e. succeeded by est) it is not so evident. The problem is how
to recognise that Tall is a positive dimensional adjective while Low is a negative dimensional adjective. We use the
dimensional adjective-dimension mapping table (discussed in previous section) to classify such adjectives to be either
positive or negative in nature. For an example we get classification done as follows:
tall → {〈Height,+〉},
big → {〈Dimension,+〉〈Number,+〉},
small → {〈Dimension,−〉〈Number,−〉},
low → {〈Depth,−〉}
To represent superlative object modifier sentences in DL we introduce a primitive role hasRank and a correspond-
ing filler primitive concept Rank. The primitive filler concept denotes a rank position of some integer value x. In
case of positive superlative sentences x is equal to 1 while for negative superlative sentences x is equal to n where n
represents the number of instances in O for any arbitrary point of time. The corresponding DL rule is:
T-Box Rule (Positive Superlative Object Modifier):
S = O ⊓ ∀hasDim.(Dimension ⊓ ∀hasRank.(Rank⊓ ∀hasValue.{1}))
{1} ⊑ Integer
T-Box Rule (Negative Superlative Object Modifier):
S = O ⊓ ∀hasDim.(Dimension ⊓ ∀hasRank.(Rank⊓ ∀hasValue.{n}))
{n} ⊑ Interger
For the given example sentence given the induced T-Box definition is:
TallestS tudentPerson = TallThing⊓S tudent⊓Person⊓∀hasHeight.(Height⊓∀hasRank.(Rank⊓∀hasValue.{1}))
Here O is TallStudent. The A-box assertion is:
TallestS tudentPerson(John)
Height(HJohn)
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hasHeight(John, HJohn)
Rank(rJohn)
hasRank(HJohn, rJohn)
hasValue(rJohn, 1)
There can be factual sentences where the object modifier is comparative in nature. An example sentence is: “John
is a more intelligent student than Mary”. Here the first object (i.e. Student) modifier Intelligent represents a certain
qualitative or quantitative degree of intelligence of the subject John. It also shows that the degree of intelligence of
John is greater than that of the second object Mary. To represent this aspect in DL we introduce a new role called
hasGreaterValue and its corresponding primitive filler nominal concept {d}where d is an integer variable. The model-
theoretic interpretation of hasGreaterValue is as follows:
hasGreaterValueI = {(x, y) ∈ △I×△I | ∃({d1}, {d2}); {d1}I ⊆ △I∧{d2}I ⊆ △I∧x ∈ {d1}I∧y ∈ {d2}I → lessThan(y, x)}
The corresponding T-Box translation rule is as follows:
S = O1 ⊓ ∀hasDim.(Dimension ⊓ ∀hasUnit.(Unit ⊓ ∀hasValue.(∀hasGreaterValue.{dO2})))
O2 = O1 ⊓ ∀hasDim.(Dimension ⊓ ∀hasUnit.(Unit ⊓ ∀hasValue.{dO2}))
For the given example the induced T-Box is:
MoreIntelligentS tudentMaryPerson = IntelligentS tudent⊓Person⊓∀hasQuality.(Quality⊓∀hasUnit.(AbstractUnit⊓
∀hasValue.(∀hasGreaterValue.{dMaryPerson})))
MaryPerson = IntelligentS tudent⊓Person⊓∀hasQuality.(Quality⊓∀hasUnit.(AbstractUnit⊓∀hasValue.{dMaryPerson}))
The corresponding A-Box assertions are as follows:
MoreIntelligentS tudentMaryPerson(John)
MaryPerson(Mary)
4.3.2.10. Ranked Superlative Object Modifier.
There are yet another kind of sentences that denotes a rank along with a superlative sense. For an example, in the
sentence: “John is the third tallest student.” the subject John has a rank 3rd with respect to the tallest student. For such
sentences we require some modification to the representation given in the previous section. For positive superlative
sentences the rank position x takes the value of m (where m denotes the mth position from top). For negative sentences
x takes the value (p = n - m)th position from the top (where n is the total number of assertions in the object conept).
Over here we only show the induced T-Box:
T-Box Rule (Positive Ranked Superlative):
S = O ⊓ ∀hasDim.(Dimension ⊓ ∀hasRank.(Rank⊓ ∀hasValue.{m}))
{m} ⊑ Integer
T-Box Rule (Negative Ranked Superlative):
S = O ⊓ ∀hasDim.(Dimension ⊓ ∀hasRank.(Rank⊓ ∀hasValue.{p}))
{p} ⊑ Integer
4.3.2.11. Tense Ambiguity.
Tense ambiguity occurs when it is not clear through any reading of a sentence whether the sentence can be exis-
tentially valid at the time when the statement was made. This phenomenon can be observed in IS-A sentences for the
following cases:
CASE 1 (past tense ambiguity): The past tense variation of is a poses a difficult ontological ambiguity. To illustrate
this we take the example of the sentence: “Mammoths were huge”. In this case, the subject concept (i.e. Mammoth)
23
does not exist currently. At the same time, the ontological validity of the subject concept will never change. In other
words, Mammals will always remain huge with respect to any given time point. However, this is not true for all
sentences with equivalent characterization. For an example, in the sentence: “Human was uncivilized.” this actually
means that the subject concept Human is no more uncivilized. In other words, Human being UncivilizedThing is not
ontologically valid. It should be noted that this can only be said if we know that the subject concept has a different
ontological validity at present.
DLOLIS−A does not attempt to solve this problem. Instead, it takes a “play safe” attitude to guarantee at least par-
tial ontological validity of such sentences. In this approach the subject can be either what it was before or otherwise.
Hence, Mammoth can be a HugeThing or a non-HugeThing. However, this would mean that Mammoth is a kind of
anything which is a tautology and hence, adds no new information to the knowledge base. Thus, Mammoth must have
a base role called Past Pointer Role (PPR) that states that it is a subset of something that is either a HugeThing or has
the PPR relation to HugeThing. The model-theoretic interpretation of PPR is:
PPRI = {(x, y) ∈ △I × △I | ∃(S, O) ∃(tPPR, tpr); lessThan(tPPR, tpr) ∧ SI ⊆ △I ∧ OI ⊆ △I ∧ x ∈ SI ∧ y ∈ OI∧ →
O(x, tPPR)}
Here S is the subject (i.e. domain of PPR), O is the object (i.e. range of PPR), tpr is the present time when the
statement is made, and O(x, tPPR) means that x belongs to the object concept O at time point tPPR. The corresponding
T-Box rule is as follows:
T-Box Rule (Past Tense Ambiguity):
S ⊑ (O ⊔ ∀PPR.O)
O ⊑ ¬∀PPR.O
A-Box Rule (Past Tense Ambiguity for Proper Noun Subject):
If [S = NNP] Then
([‘PPR’ +‘O’+WordNet.getMSP(S)])(S)
[WordNet.getMSP(S)](S)
T-Box Induction Rule (Past Tense Ambiguity for Proper Noun Subject):
[‘PPR’+‘O’+WordNet.getMSP(S)⊑ (O ⊔∀ PPR.O)
O ⊑ ∀ PPR.O
[‘PPR’+‘O’+WordNet.getMSP(S)]⊑ [WordNet.getMSP(S)]
CASE 2 (future tense ambiguity): Sometimes certain types of adverb (RB) modifies the is a component of a structure
of the form: [M = RB][S ][IS − A][O]or[S ][IS − A][M = RB][O]. Such kinds of modification creates an ontological
ambiguity that cannot be captured in classical DL. For an example, in the sentence “Eventually sun is a black hole.”
the subject concept Sun is not a Black Hole as of now but is in the process of becoming in the future. In such cases we
introduce a base role called Future Pointer Role (FPR) that states that Sun is a subset of something that is eventually
Black Hole (called EventuallyBlackHole) and has the FPR relation to BlackHole. The model-theoretic interpretation
of FPR is:
FPRI = {(x, y) ∈ △I × △I | ∃(S, O) ∃(tFPR, tpr); SI ⊆ △I ∧OI ⊆ △I ∧ x ∈ SI ∧ y ∈ OI∧ → greaterThan(tFPR, tpr) ∧
O(x, tFPR) ∧ ¬O(x, tpr)}
Here tpr is the time when the statement/assertion is made. The corresponding rule is as follows:
T-Box Rule (Future Adverbial Modifier):
S ⊑ ([‘M’+‘O’] ⊓ ∀ FPR.O)
[‘M’ +‘O’] ⊑ O
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The same rules apply for IS-A variations that are in future tense (ex: will be, shall be, etc.) except that in such
cases S ≡ ∀FPR.O
4.3.2.12. Epistemic Ambiguity.
Epistemic ambiguity occurs when there is a doubt in the existential truthfulness or scope of truthfulness of a given
sentence’s readings. This phenomenon can be observed in IS-A sentences for the following cases:
CASE 1 (subject ‘a’ modification): Linguistic nuance of the quantifier type a can generate epistemic ambiguity
in many cases. For an example, a sentence such as “A planet is round” speaks of a general truth about all planets.
However, another sentence such as “A boy is hungry” certainly does not speak of the entire boy class being hungry.
Since both these sentences have same characterization DLOLIS−A takes a “play safe” attitude to guarantee at least
partial epistemic validity of such sentences and treats the first sentence to be the same as the sentence “The planet is
round” with a indefinite sense of determiner the. This approach essentially leads to the induced (sometimes partial)
truth that “Some planets are round”. The corresponding A-Box rule and T-Box induction rule are as follows:
A-Box Rule (Subject ‘a’ Quantification):
If [Q = a][S = NNsing][isa][O = NN] Then
[‘O+S’]([‘S X’])
Here ‘X’ indicates the Xth instance of the subject S encountered so far.
T-Box Induction Rule (Subject ‘a’ Quantification):
If [Q = a][S = NNsing][isa][O = NN] Then
[‘O’+‘S’] ⊑ S
[‘O’+‘S’] ⊑ O
It may be so that the subject is a named entity (i.e. NNP). For an example, in the sentence: “A John is a student” we
are talking about some John who is probably not well known. For such cases the following A-Box rule and its T-Box
induction rule are valid:
A-Box Rule (Proper Noun Subject ‘a’ Quantification):
If [S = NNP] Then
([‘O’+WordNet.getMSP(S)])(S)
[WordNet.getMSP(S)](S)
T-Box Induction Rule (Proper Noun Subject ‘a’ Quantification):
[‘O’+ WordNet.getMSP(S)] ⊑ O
[‘O’+ WordNet.getMSP(S)] ⊑ S
[‘O’+ WordNet.getMSP(S)] ⊑ [WordNet.getMSP(S)]
CASE 2 (“may be” variation of “is a”): An important and well-studied case of epistemic ambiguity is sentences
of type may be. In such sentences the ontological validity of a statement is uncertain. For an example, in the sentence:
“John may be a student” it is uncertain whether John is student now. To resolve this issue using classical DL repre-
sentation we introduce a new base role called mayBe. The model-theoretic interpretation of mayBe is :
mayBeI = {(x, y) ∈ △I×△I | ∃(S, O) ∃tpr; SI ⊆ △I∧OI ⊆ △I∧x ∈ SI∧y ∈ OI∧ → greaterThan(prob(O(x, tpr)), 0)}
Here prob(.,.) is a 2-place functional that calculates the probability of O(x, tpr). The corresponding T-Box rule is
as follows:
T-Box Rule (may be Ambiguity):
S ≡ ∀mayBe.O
CASE 3 (“can become” variation of “is a”): In the situation where the is a variation is of type can become yet an-
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other kind of epistemic ambiguity arises that is similar to what is discussed in section 4.3.2.11 (case 2). We introduce
a new base role called canBecome to represent this case. While FPR, in the previous case, guarantees the ontological
validity of a subject concept after some point of time canBecome does not guarantee any such ontological validity. It
simply states the potentiality of the subject concept to reach an ontological status. Therefore, the current ontological
status is never specified in this type of sentence. The model-theoretic interpretation of canBecome is:
canBecomeI = {(x, y) ∈ △I × △I | ∃(S, O) ∃(tFPR, tpr); SI ⊆ △I ∧ OI ⊆ △I
∧ x ∈ SI ∧ y ∈ OI → greaterThan(prob(O(x, tFPR)), 0) ∧
greaterThan(tFPR, tpr) ∧ ¬O(x, tpr)}
The corresponding T-Box rule is as follows:
T-Box Rule (can become Ambiguity):
S ≡ ∀canBecome.O
CASE 4 (“can be” variation of “is a”): There can be another variant of can become of the type can be. The
semantic difference between these two can be quite ambiguous and depends upon the context. One reading of can be
kind of sentence is the same as that of may be kind while another reading may be the same as that of can become kind.
For an example, in the sentence: “John can be a student body member” one reading can be that we are not sure about
the ontological validity of John to be a student body member at the time when the assertion was made while another
reading can be that John has the potential to become a student body member in the future. We introduce another base
role for this case called canBe. The model-theoretic interpretation of canBe is:
canBeI = canBecomeI ∪mayBeI
The corresponding T-Box rule is as follows:
T-Box Rule (can be Ambiguity):
S ≡ ∀canBe.O
CASE 5 (“is now” variation of “is a”): Another variation of is a that creates epistemic ambiguity is is now.
The semantic difference between is now and is can again be ambiguous and context-dependent. In the sentence:
“John is now a student” there can be two readings. One reading may suggest that John was not a student before
but a student now. Another reading may suggest that although John is a student now he may not be so in the future.
To represent this semantic non-triviality we introduce the base role isNow and give a model-theoretic interpretation as:
isNowI = {(x, y) ∈ △I × △I | ∃(S, O) ∃(tFPR, tpr); greaterThan(tFPR, tpr) ∧ SI ⊆ △I ∧ OI ⊆ △I
∧ x ∈ SI ∧ y ∈ OI → x ∈ OI ∧ ((greaterThan(prob(¬O(x, tFPR)), 0)) ∨ (x, y) ∈ PPRI)
greaterThan(tFPR, tpr) ∧ ¬O(x, tpr)}
The corresponding T-Box rule is as follows:
T-Box Rule (“is now” Ambiguity):
S ≡ ∀isNow.O
CASE 6 (“is still” variation of “is a”): The ambiguity caused by the is a variation is still is related to the past tense
ambiguity. While in past tense ambiguity the ontological validity of the present is uncertain and mutually disjoint with
that of the past in contrast in the is still case past ontological validity is retained in the present. The corresponding
T-Box rule is:
T-Box Rule (“is still” Ambiguity):
S ⊑ (O ⊓ ∀PPR.O)
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CASE 7 (“is sometimes” variation of “is a”): Another epistemic ambiguity arises due to is sometimes variation
of is a. The problem introduced by this variation is that the ontological validity cannot be assigned to a fixed or
known period of time. For an example, in the sentence: “John is sometimes happy” we can neither assert John to be
a happy person in the past nor in the present and not even in the future. All we can say is that there are some time
points (ts) when John ceases to be a happy person. To represent this semantics we introduce another base role called
isSometimes and the model theoretic interpretation is as follows:
isSometimesI = {(x, y) ∈ △I × △I | ∃(S, O) ∃(t, ts);¬equalTo(t, ts) ∧ SI ⊆ △I ∧ OI ⊆ △I
∧ x ∈ SI ∧ y ∈ OI → ¬O(x, ts) ∧ O(x, t)}
The corresponding T-Box rule is as follows:
T-Box Rule (“is sometimes” Ambiguity):
S ≡ ∀isSometimes.O
4.3.2.13. Non-trivial Compound IS-A Sentence.
There are some compound sentences that do not follow the characterization template as given in section 4.1.1
Such sentences are characterized by the template:
[[Q]][[M]][S 1][IS A][[Q]][[M]][O1][ClCN][[Q]][[M]][S 2][IS A][[Q]][[M]][O2]
Here [ClCN ] is a conjunctive clause of type whereas. For an example, in the sentence: “Apple is a fruit whereas
cauliflower is a vegetable.” there are two independent simple IS-A sentences: “Apple is a fruit.” and “Cauliflower is
a vegetable.”
4.4. Ontology Generation & Consistency Checking (Task 4 & Task 5)
DLOLIS−A generates a regular T-Box and A-Box. Hence, the regular ontology needs to be converted into its
corresponding generalized form (i.e. axiomatic ontology in the form of concept taxonomy). For that the we use
FACT++ v.1.6.1 reasoner12 [83] for DL subsumption based taxonomy generation. It also validates the consistency of
the generated taxonomy at the same time. The entire DLOL architectural pipeline is given in Figure 1.
5. Evaluation
The goal of evaluation of the proposed DLOLIS−A tool was twofold: (i) to test the characterization accuracy of the
proposed IS-A characterization and (ii) to test the Ontology Learning accuracy of the tool. DLOLIS−A is implemented
with JAVA on a machine of 4 GB RAM and operating system as Windows home basic.
5.1. Characterization Accuracy:
Since DLOLIS−A is a rule based tool it is important to empirically verify whether the rule set is comprehensive
or not. It is to be noted that all the T-Box and A-Box rules are interpretations of all possible linguistically valid
phrase structures that can be characterized as per the characterization templates. Hence, in order to evaluate the
comprehensiveness of the rule set we first need to check whether the characterization templates for simple, complex,
and compound sentences are scalable. For scalability evaluation we chose the WCL v.1.1 (wiki good.txt) test corpus
[26]. WCL was chosen because of several reasons: (i) it is a factual dataset, (ii) it is domain independent and is mostly
extracted from Wikipedia covering broad range of topics, (iii) it is mostly definitional thereby including lot of IS-A
sentences, and (iv) it mostly excludes pronoun based anaphoric ambiguity (resolution of which is out of the scope
of the current paper). The dataset contains 1777 sentences (IS-A, non IS-A, and mixed). We employed 2 research
assistants to create a subset of IS-A sentences from these documents and validated the dataset by a linguist.
12http://code.google.com/p/factplusplus
27
Figure 1: DLOLIS−A Architecture
Table 1: Dataset Distribution
Dataset No. of Sentences No. of pure non IS-A No. of extracted IS-A
Trivial Non-Trivial
WCL v. 1.1 1777 240 1537 0
Vehicle 150 0 150 0
Virus 172 0 171 1
Plant 638 5 628 5
Full details of the dataset is given in Table 1. We then fed the dataset to DLOLIS−A characterizer which triple ex-
tracted the sentences, singularized them where appropriate, normalized them, and then finally set them into appropriate
characterization templates. We then manually checked the number of correctly characterized sentences (measured by
Characterization Precision) and also the number of falsely rejected sentences (measured by Characterization Recall).
We define each of these measures as follows:
Definition 1 (Characterization Precision): Characterization Precision (or CP) is the ratio of the number of correctly
characterized sentences to the total number of sentences characterized.
Definition 2 (Characterization Recall): Characterization Recall (or CR) is the ratio of the number of correctly
characterized sentences to the total number of sentences in the dataset.
Table 2: DLOL Characterization Performance
Dataset IS-A Characterized Rejected Correctly Characterized POS Tagger Fault CP CR
WCL v. 1.1 1528 9 1528 9 1 0.9941
Vehicle 147 3 147 3 1 0.98
Virus 163 9 163 9 1 0.9477
Plant 631 2 631 2 1 0.9968
We observed 100% CP and 99% CR when we tested the DLOLIS−A characterizer on WCL dataset. It needs to
be mentioned that the POS tagger accuracy plays an important role in the characterization accuracy of DLOLIS−A
since inaccurate classification of a particular lexicon POS type may lead to: (i) inaccurate triple extraction and/or
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(ii) misfitting of a sentence by the characterizer. To validate the results we used three domain-specific datasets from
Vehicle, Virus, and Plant domains as used in [12]. We observed similar CP and CR for each of these datasets (Table
2).
5.2. OL Accuracy (Trivial IS-A Data Set):
For this evaluation we adopted a Gold Standard evaluation technique widely followed in the community [84].
We evaluated DLOLIS−A in comparison to a benchmark light-weight ontology learner called Text2Onto [14] and a
formal ontology learner called FRED [25]. The WCL IS-A dataset was given to 2 independent ontology engineers
who manually created different (version A and B) of WCL IS-A dataset. Version A contains 4747 concepts while
Version B contains 3135 concepts. The same dataset was then fed into DLOLIS−A , FRED, and Text2Onto and their
respective taxonomies were collected. The summarized statistics of the taxonomies created by both the ontology
engineer, DLOLIS−A, FRED, and Text is given in Table 3.
Table 3: Topological Characteristics of Engineered/Learned Ontology on WCL IS-A Dataset13
Ontology Concepts(C) Cparent/C Csibling/C
NT NPr ND average max average max
Ver. A 4747 4547 200 3 5 14 40
Ver. B 3135 2928 207 3 6 12 40
DLOL 4503 4320 183 4 7 22 92
FRED 3396 1799 1597 4 6 9 20
Text2Onto 1791 1791 0 2 2 11 33
Table 4: Comparative Analysis of DLOLIS−A on WCL IS-A Dataset
Measure DLOL (4503 Concepts) FRED (3396 Concepts) Text2Onto (1791 Concepts)
Ver. A Ver. B Ver. A Ver. B Ver. A Ver. B
LP 0.6617 0.4895 0.7187 0.5887 0.8668 0.728
LR 0.6207 0.696 0.5147 0.639 0.327 0.4163
LF 0.6405 0.5748 0.5998 0.6128 0.4749 0.5297
OI 0.3176 0.7326 0.2014 0.4464 0.0502 0.1555
OL 0.3648 0.2883 0.4852 0.3609 0.6729 0.5836
TP 0.9658 0.9646 0.9857 0.976 0.4125 0.6903
TR 0.9786 0.7176 0.9287 0.629 0.9814 0.8985
TF 0.9722 0.8231 0.9563 0.7651 0.581 0.7808
TF’ 0.7577 0.7542 0.6693 0.6963 0.4185 0.5431
We adopted four different standard accuracy evaluation measures: (i) Lexical Accuracy (LA: LP, LR, LF), (ii)
Ontology Improvement (OI), (iii) Ontology Loss (OL), and (iv) Taxonomic Accuracy (TA: TP, TR, TF). Each of these
four measures have their own advantages and disadvantages. Formal definitions of all of these can be found in [4].
For our experiment we used an off-shelf package called OntEval14 for LA, and TA calculation. Based on the results,
OI and OL was then calculated. The results for all the measures on versions A and B are given in Table 4.
LA measures the number of concepts that have been correctly identified by an ontology learner as compared to
the concepts that have been identified by the engineer. With respect to Ver. A, DLOLIS−A LP (lexical precision)
performance comes to approx. 66% as compared to the best result (given by Text2Onto) which is approx. 87%. With
respect to Ver. B, a similar behavior is observed where DLOLIS−A has LP value of 49% whereas Text2Onto has 73%.
Although DLOLIS−A may not look very promising in terms of LP yet we need to note that LP heavily penalizes all
correctly identified concepts that are not identified by a human engineer. Also, even a single concept identification that
13NT : Number of Concepts, NPr :Number of primitive concepts, ND: Number of derived concepts.
14http://staffwww.dcs.shef.ac.uk/people/Z.Zhang/onteval/
29
is correct will lead to an LP value of 100%. This can be easily understood by the performance of DLOLIS−A in terms
of LR (Lexical Recall). For both Ver. A and Ver. B it outperforms Text2Onto considerably (with a value of 62% vs.
33% for Ver. A and 70% vs. 42% for Ver. B). However, we did not observe that much improvement when compared
to FRED (62% vs. 51% for Ver. A and 70% vs. 64% for Ver. B). This is primarily because FRED also does formal
OL with deep linguistic analysis. Also, the WCL IS-A dataset does not contain many of the identified complicated
trivial and none of identified non-trivial cases for which DLOLIS−A has been specifically developed and as a result
has a unique edge over FRED. The drawback of LP can be easily understood by the analysis done with the measure
OI which, on the other hand, rewards the extra number of concepts that are generated by the learner with respect to
the human engineer. For Ver. A DLOLIS−A shows 32% OI as compared to Text2Onto which shows only 5% OI and
FRED which shows 20% OI. For Ver. B, DLOLIS−A shows 73% OI as compared to Text2Onto which shows 16% OI
and FRED which shows 45% OI. It is noteworthy that this observation suggests that there is a strong evidence that
the competence of engineer A is better than engineer B. We also noted down the LF-1 score of all the three learners
with respect to Ver. A and Ver. B. LF-1 is the Harmonic Mean of LR and LP. We then evaluated DLOLIS−A in terms
of OL. OL measures the number of concepts that are extra in the engineered ontology in comparison to the learner
generated ontology. OL is a dual of Lexical Recall (LR) in the sense that OL = 1 - LR. This measure is perhaps the
best among the three lexicon based measures since it is less prone to error and only wrongly penalizes the learner if
the expert produces lot of junks (which is less likely). On both the versions we found that DLOLIS−A stands out to be
the best with 36% and 29% OL as compared to Text2Onto with 67% and 58% OL respectively and FRED with 49%
and 36% OL respectively.
The drawback of all the above measures is that, they are concept lexicon based and incapable of understanding the
accuracy of the learner in terms of the similarity of the generated taxonomic structure in comparison to the expert made
taxonomic structure. This problem is somewhat resolved by the fourth measure, TA. TA does graph matching in terms
of common semantic cotopy (csc) between an expert ontology and a learned ontology [4]. When tested on both Ver.
A and Ver. B, we observed that the TP (Taxonomic Precision) of DLOLIS−A is 97% and 96% respectively, while that
of Text2Onto is 41% and 69% respectively and FRED is 99% and 98% respectively. We see a better performance by
FRED because DLOLIS−A generated some additional correct concepts that were not identified by both the engineers
and also not identified by FRED. In other words, TP may wrongly penalize identification of extra yet correct concepts.
When we tested DLOLIS−A on both the versions with respect to TR (Taxonomic Recall) we saw that it scored about
98% and 72% respectively as compared to Text2Onto which has a score of 98% and 90% respectively and FRED
which has a score of 93% and 63% respectively. This is because since the generation of additional concepts by
Text2Onto is comparatively small (13% extra for version A and 27% extra for version B) the taxonomic topology that
is generated has very high sub-graph match with the taxonomy produced by the engineered ontologies. On the other
hand, DLOLIS−A produces lot more extra correctly identified concepts (34% extra for version A and 51% extra for
version B) thereby creating relatively lower sub-graph match. If we look at the performance of FRED we see that
it created 28% extra concepts in Ver. A and 41% extra in Ver. B. This clearly indicates that although DLOLIS−A is
creating more additional concepts as compared to FRED yet from a sub-graph match point of view it is closer to the
engineered ontologies in terms of topological alignment as compared to FRED. In other words, the extra concepts
created by DLOLIS−A are not noisy but are either hyponymy or hypernymy of the concepts in the engineered ontology
whereas the extra concepts created by FRED are noisy. It also shows that TP and TR are not good measures since they
strongly reward exact topological matches and wrongly penalizes hyponymic and/or hypernymic extensions of the
base engineered ontology. The overall conclusion is usually drawn by the measure TF’ that computes the Harmonic
Mean of TF-1 and LF-1 scores. We saw that DLOLIS−A outperforms Text2Onto by a considerable margin for both the
versions with scores 76% and 75% respectively.
5.3. OL Accuracy (Non-Trivial IS-A Data Set)
We observed that although WCL IS-A dataset contains sufficiently many IS-A sentences yet there is not a single
evidence of non-trivial IS-A sentence. Therefore to reinforce the primary argument of this paper we developed a
community representative dataset (Table A.2) containing 42 non-trivial representative IS-A sentences that cover all
the non-trivial cases discussed in this paper and some more cases that could not be discussed due to lack of space.
We also made a similar community representative dataset (Table A.1) of 26 trivial IS-A sentences since many trivial
cases were not covered by the WCL IS-A dataset. This testing was primarily done to see how well DLOLIS−A works
in terms of linguistic cases not covered in the WCL IS-A dataset as compared to FRED. Text2Onto is kept out of
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Figure 2: DLOLIS−A Runtime Performance Figure 3: DLOLIS−A Cumulative Runtime Performance
the discussion because it is already obvious in section 5.2 that on an overall basis (i.e. TF’ score) Text2Onto is far
outperformed by DLOLIS−A . In Table A.1. In Table 5 show a comparative analysis on trivial and non-trivial IS-A
sentences. We observed that 9 out of 26 distinct trivial cases were incorrectly translated by FRED while it incorrectly
translated 27 out 42 distinct non-trivial cases. Table A.1 and Table A.2 clearly shows that there can be many factual
trivial and non-trivial IS-A sentences on which FRED will either not work or will only be partially correct in terms of
formal semantic construction.
Table 5: Comparative Analysis of DLOLIS−A on Custom Community Dataset
Wrong Semantic Construction FRED DLOL
Trivial 0.3846 0
Non-Trivial 0.6429 0
Partial Semantic Construction FRED DLOL
Trivial 0.2692 0
Non-Trivial 0.2619 0.0714
Correct Semantic Construction FRED DLOL
Trivial 0.3846 1
Non-Trivial 0.0952 0.9286
5.4. OL Runtime Efficiency
We analyzed the runtime efficiency of DLOLIS−A for the preprocessing phase (triple extraction, singularization, &
normalization), the characterization phase, and the DL translation phase (i.e. generation of the OWL file) individually.
We divided the corpus into 15 sets. We saw that without taking preprocessing and characterization time DLOLIS−A
takes 8.50 seconds for a set of 100 sentences and 40.62 seconds for a set of 1537 sentences (Figure 2). DL translation
on an average the takes 8.29 seconds more than that of preprocessing phase and characterization phase together (Figure
2). The overall runtime of the entire process is given in Figure 3. The total reasoning time by Fact++ (for further
axiom induction and consistency checking) after the OWL file generation was 0.239 ms. It is to be understood that
web-scale knowledge base generation takes place in a distributed environment with high-end machines and hence, the
figures only represent the approximate growth rate of DL translation and also how the translation phase compares to
the other two phases. Also, it is to be noted that the entire process is off-line in nature.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper we propose a Description Logics (DL) based formal ontology learning on trivial and non-trivial
factual IS-A sentences. The advantages of DL over other semantic theories widely accepted in the computational
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linguistic community is that DL is decidable, compact, and highly optimized supportive reasoners can be found for
knowledge discovery. Also DL has a one to one correspondence with OWL - the W3C recommended language for
ontology representation. We developed a learner called DLOLIS−A and tested that in terms of accuracy and runtime
efficiency. We saw that with respect to the standard OL evaluation measures DLOLIS−A proved to be considerably
better as compared to benchmark tools such as Text2Onto and FRED when tested on the WCL IS-A dataset. We also
manually created two representative datasets for trivial and non-trivial IS-A categories and tested both DLOLIS−A and
FRED.
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Appendix A. Community Representative Dataset
Table A.1: Custom Community Dataset (Trivial IS-A)
No. Trivial Factual IS-A Types FRED DLOL
1 Animal is a category of cat no yes
2 Man is an animal partial yes
3 John is a student yes yes
4 Carnivorous animal includes Kitty no yes
5 Some men are intelligent beings yes yes
6 Some women are smokers yes yes
7 Nearly all men are student yes yes
8 The woman is a student yes yes
9 All cats are mammal partial yes
10 No human is a fruit no yes
11 Human is the weak creature yes yes
12 Animal is some creature partial yes
13 Men are not women no yes
14 The activists are some students partial yes
15 The movie stars are some rich people yes yes
16 Wild cat is a mammal partial yes
17 House boat is a kind of vessel no yes
18 Sea plane is an air vehicle partial yes
19 Cat is an carnivorous animal is wild yes yes
20 Cat is an animal that is a carnivorous mammal yes yes
21 A cat that is Persian is long-haired yes yes
22 Boys, such as John and Joe, are students no yes
23 Such boys as John and Joe are students no yes
24 Boys, including John and Joe, are students no yes
25 Boys, especially John and Joe, are students no yes
26 Either John or Joe, who are good students, is student body member partial yes
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Table A.2: Custom Community Dataset (Non-Trivial IS-A)
No. Non-Trivial Factual IS-A Types FRED DLOL
1 John is naughty partial yes
2 John is Mary’s brother yes yes
3 The name John is very popular yes yes
4 King Williams is brave no yes
5 Five students are intelligent no yes
6 Intel Pentium 4 is a microprocessor partial yes
7 Four wheeled vehicle includes sedan partial yes
8 Playing soccer is healthy no partial
9 Running water is soothing no yes
10 Apple is like orange no yes
11 Tangerine and orange are similar no yes
12 Advocate and lawyer are same no yes
13 School includes students and teachers partial yes
14 Cat is a member of the family Felidae no yes
15 Felidae is a family of cats no yes
16 An Angiosperm is any vascular plant yes yes
17 A vegetable is any of many herbaceous plants no yes
18 Only John is a student partial yes
19 John is one of the students no yes
20 John is the only student no yes
21 John is a student only no yes
22 John is only a student no yes
23 John is a unique student no yes
24 John is 5 foot tall no yes
25 John is the tallest student partial yes
26 John is one of the tallest students no yes
27 John is the third most popular student no yes
28 John is a more intelligent student than Mary partial yes
29 John is one of the taller students no yes
30 Mammoths were huge no partial
31 Eventually sun is a black hole no yes
32 John will be a student partial yes
33 A planet is round partial partial
34 A boy is hungry yes yes
35 John may be a student partial yes
36 John can become the student body leader. no yes
37 John can be a student body member no yes
38 John is now a student. no yes
39 John is still a student no yes
40 John is sometimes happy no yes
41 John was a student when he was young partial yes
42 Apple is a fruit whereas cauliflower is a vegetable no yes
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